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CLAPPER V. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AND DATA PRIVACY 
LITIGATION: IS A CHANGE TO THE LAW “CERTAINLY 
IMPENDING”? 
 
John L. Jacobus & Benjamin B. Watson

 
 
Cite as: John L. Jacobus & Benjamin B. Watson, Clapper v. Amnesty 
International and Data Privacy Litigation: Is a Change to the Law 
“Certainly Impending”?, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3 (2014), 
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v21i1/article3.pdf. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
[1] On December 19, 2013, the retailer Target announced that 
unauthorized third parties had gained access to its customer payment 
information.
1
  While Target originally estimated that the security breach 
affected 40 million of its customers, a subsequent investigation revealed 
that anywhere from 70 to 110 million people—almost one in three 
Americans—may have had their sensitive payment information stolen.2  In 
response, the retailer offered free credit monitoring services and assured 
affected customers that they would not be responsible for fraudulent 
charges made with their payment information.
3
  But these actions could 
not placate all customers impacted by the breach; less than a month after 
                                                 

 John L. Jacobus is a Partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Steptoe & Johnson LLP.  
Benjamin B. Watson is an Associate in the Washington, D.C. office of Steptoe & 
Johnson LLP. 
 
1
 Elizabeth A. Harris & Nicole Perlroth, For Target, the Breach Numbers Grow, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2014, at B1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/11/business/target-breach-affected-70-million-
customers.html, archived at http://perma.cc/FV24-SJTP.  
 
2
 Id. 
 
3
 Joel Schectman, Target Faces Nearly 70 Lawsuits Over Breach, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 15, 
2014 6:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/01/15/target-faces-nearly-
70-lawsuits-over-breach/, archived at http://perma.cc/5FWA-JSNC. 
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 2 
its first announcement, Target faced sixty-eight class action lawsuits in 
twenty-one states and the District of Columbia.
4
   
 
[2] Though of exceptional size, the Target data breach is just one of 
many recent incidents where businesses have lost or exposed the sensitive 
personal information—often referred to as personally identifiable 
information, or “PII”—of their customers.  The frequency and extent of 
these breaches have grown considerably over the past decade.  One 
organization estimates that the number of reported data-loss incidents has 
increased from 157 in 2005 to 1,467 in 2013.
5
  According to another 
organization, since 2005 over 4,455 data breaches have resulted in the 
exposure of over 620 million records.
6
  What is more, this increase in data 
breaches has occurred at the same time as advances in technology have 
enabled businesses to track, collect, and store information about their 
customers with unprecedented scale and sophistication.
7
 
   
[3] The dramatic increase in both data breaches and data collection has 
led to a concomitant increase in litigation.
8
  In particular, the past decade 
                                                 
4
 Id. 
 
5
 See Data Loss Statistics, DATALOSSDB, http://datalossdb.org/statistics (last visited 
Sept. 11, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/TN3R-FYC3.  
 
6
 See Data Breaches, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CENTER, 
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/id-theft/data-breaches.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/BP93-BMTL.  
 
7
 See, e.g., Scott Thurm & Yukari Iwatani Kane, Your Apps Are Watching You, WALL. 
ST. J. (Dec. 18, 2010, 12:01AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704368004576027751867039730.html 
(documenting how third-party applications on smartphones can transmit information 
about the phone’s user, including age, gender, and other personal details), archived at 
http://perma.cc/M3UP-643W. 
 
8
 See Dana Post & Anupreet Singh Amole, Anticipate Litigation After Data Breaches, 
LAW TECH. NEWS (Aug. 25, 2014), 
http://www.lawtechnologynews.com/id=1202667090150/Anticipate-Litigation-After-
Data-Breaches, archived at http://perma.cc/HHY6-5LBZ.  
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has witnessed the rise of two different types of lawsuits.  First, customers 
have begun suing companies that lose their PII in data breaches, often 
alleging that the breach has caused them an increased risk of falling victim 
to identity theft.  Second, individuals have filed lawsuits challenging how 
businesses collect, track, and share PII.  Plaintiffs in these cases, often 
users of social networking websites or smart devices, have alleged that the 
defendant businesses gathered, without consent, their contact information, 
web browsing history, and even physical location. 
 
[4] Plaintiffs in both types of lawsuits, however, have frequently 
encountered a common hurdle: the requirement under Article III of the 
United States Constitution that a plaintiff have “standing” to sue.9  In 
particular, some courts have been reluctant to conclude that a plaintiff who 
has had her PII either collected or lost has experienced the type of 
concrete injury—often referred to as “injury-in-fact”—that grants her 
access to the judicial system.  Plaintiffs have responded by advancing a 
number of different theories for why they have suffered injury-in-fact.  
Plaintiffs in data breach cases have most commonly argued that their 
injury arises from an increased risk of identity theft.
10
  Plaintiffs in data 
collection cases, meanwhile, have argued that their PII has intrinsic 
economic value or that the collection of their PII breached express or 
implied contracts between them and the defendant.
11
  These arguments for 
injury-in-fact have divided federal courts.  Commentators, meanwhile, 
have suggested different ways to address this legal issue.
12
 
                                                 
9
 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 
10
 See, e.g., In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig. 996 F. 
Supp. 2d 942, 970 (S.D. Cal. 2014).  
 
11
 See, e.g., In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 299, 326 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005); Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 74 (1st Cir. 2012).  
 
12
 See, e.g., Patricia Cave, Comment, Giving Consumers a Leg to Stand on: Finding 
Plaintiffs a Legislative Solution to the Barrier from Federal Courts in Data Security 
Breach Suits, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 765, 789 (2013); Miles L. Galbraith, Comment, 
Identity Crisis: Seeking a Unified Approach to Plaintiff Standing for Data Security 
Breaches of Sensitive Personal Information, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1365, 1399 (2013); 
Vincent R. Johnson, Credit-Monitoring Damages in Cybersecurity Tort Litigation, 19 
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[5] Although the Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the issue of 
standing to challenge data collection and storage by private businesses, it 
recently addressed the standing of litigants to challenge data collection by 
the government.  In Clapper v. Amnesty International, USA, the Supreme 
Court held that plaintiffs who sought to bring a constitutional challenge to 
a federal foreign surveillance law lacked standing because they had failed 
to allege that the law created a sufficiently “impending” risk of future 
harm to them.
13
  Many commentators quickly suggested that Clapper, 
although arising from the national security sphere, could be a potential 
game-changer for data privacy litigation.
14
  But the few data breach 
decisions so far to address Clapper in detail have reached different 
conclusions about its impact on existing standing law.
15
  Whether Clapper 
will produce a uniform approach to data privacy claims in lower courts 
remains to be seen. 
 
[6] This article provides an overview of the various theories of 
standing that plaintiffs have advanced in data privacy cases and the 
success those theories have had in federal courts.  It then considers what 
impact the Supreme Court’s decision in Clapper may have for these 
theories going forward.  Part I provides a summary of the Supreme 
Court’s decisions on standing, and in particular those decisions that have 
addressed claims of injury premised on an increased risk of future harm.  
Part II catalogs the decisions in which courts have evaluated the Article III 
                                                                                                                         
GEO. MASON L. REV. 113, 144 (2011) ; James Graves, Comment, “Medical” Monitoring 
for Non-Medical Harms: Evaluating the Reasonable Necessity of Measures to Avoid 
Identity Fraud After a Data Breach, 16 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 2, ¶¶ 39–41, 51 (2009), 
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v16i1/article2.pdf. 
 
13
 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013). 
 
14
 See, e.g., Alison Frankel, How SCOTUS Wiretap Ruling Helps Internet Privacy 
Defendants, REUTERS, Mar. 12, 2013, http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/2013/03/12/how-scotus-wiretap-ruling-helps-internet-privacy-defendants/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/H4UU-CX5J. 
 
15
 See infra section IV. 
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 5 
standing of plaintiffs seeking damages for the collection, transfer, or 
disclosure of their PII.  Part III evaluates the effect that Clapper has had 
on these cases so far, and explores what potential effects Clapper may 
have in the future.  Part IV sets forth some tentative conclusions about 
what Clapper means for future data privacy litigation. 
 
II.  PROVING INJURY-IN-FACT UNDER ARTICLE III 
[7] Article III of the Constitution permits federal courts to hear only 
“cases” or “controversies.”16  These two words are the basis for the legal 
doctrine known as Article III “standing”: the idea that a plaintiff must 
demonstrate she has an actual, concrete interest at stake in her case and 
therefore may invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court.
17
  Courts most 
often describe Article III standing as having three separate components: 
(1) injury, (2) causation, and (3) redressability.  The Supreme Court has 
described these requirements as follows: 
 
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—
an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) 
concrete and particularized, and (b) “actual or imminent, 
not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”  Second, there must be 
a causal connection between the injury and the conduct 
complained of—the injury has to be “fairly . . . traceable to 
the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . the 
result [of] the independent action of some third party not 
before the court.”  Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to 
merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a 
favorable decision.”18 
 
Establishing the first of these requirements—injury-in-fact—is often 
straightforward.  If a plaintiff has suffered some sort of injury, be it 
                                                 
16
 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 
17
 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 
18
 Id. (citation omitted). 
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monetary, physical, or even aesthetic, then she has suffered injury-in-fact.  
With respect to present injuries, standing problems typically arise only if 
the injury is a “generalized grievance” shared by a large number of 
people.
19
  With respect to future injuries, however, the law of standing 
becomes more complex.  The Supreme Court has decided a significant 
number of decisions on how likely an alleged future injury must be before 
it can support standing under Article III: in other words, whether an injury 
is, as the Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife described, “actual or 
imminent” or “conjectural or hypothetical.”20  
 
A.  Standing and the Risk of Future Injury 
[8] Clapper was not the first Supreme Court decision to consider when 
a risk of future harm is sufficiently probable to support Article III 
standing.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has considered iterations of this 
question a number of times before.  Below is a brief a summary of some of 
the Court’s more notable decisions on the issue.  
 
[9] Perhaps the Court’s most influential case on the topic of future 
harm and injury-in-fact is City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.
21
  The plaintiff in 
Lyons sued the City of Los Angeles after being stopped by Los Angeles 
police officers and subjected to what he alleged was an illegal 
chokehold.
22
  He sought damages as well as an injunction preventing the 
Los Angeles Police Department from using the same chokehold in the 
future.
23
  While the Supreme Court agreed that the plaintiff had standing 
to pursue damages for his past encounter with police, it held that he did 
not have standing to pursue injunctive relief because he had not 
                                                 
19
 See id. at 575. 
 
20
 Id. at 560. 
 
21
 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
 
22
 Id. at 97. 
 
23
 Id. at 98. 
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demonstrated a “real and immediate threat” of being subjected to the 
chokehold again in the future.
24
  For the plaintiff’s alleged harm to be 
sufficiently “real” to support standing, the Court explained, would require 
the “incredible assertion” that (1) the plaintiff would be stopped by the 
police again, and (2) that either all police officers employed such a 
chokehold in every encounter or there was an official policy for them to 
do so.
25
  
 
[10] The Supreme Court has addressed standing based on the risk of 
future harm a number of times since Lyons.  In Whitmore v. Arkansas, the 
Court found no injury-in-fact for an Arkansas death row inmate who 
sought to intervene on behalf of another inmate who had been sentenced to 
death but had waived his right to appeal.
 26
  The plaintiff argued that he 
had standing because Arkansas’ system of “comparative review” in death 
penalty cases meant that a favorable resolution of the second inmate’s 
sentence could affect his own, though only if his current sentence was 
vacated in a habeas corpus proceeding and he was then retried, 
reconvicted, and re-sentenced.
27
  The Court held that this chain of future 
events was “too speculative” to support standing.28  It explained that 
“[a]llegations of possible future injury do not satisfy the requirements of 
Art. III,” and that “[a] threatened injury must be ‘certainly impending’ to 
constitute injury in fact.”29  
 
[11] In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services 
(TOC), Inc., the Court held that a group of plaintiffs did have standing to 
                                                 
24
 Id. at 105. 
 
25
 Id. at 106. 
 
26
 Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 151, 156–57 (1990). 
 
27
 Id. at 156. 
 
28
 Id. at 157. 
 
29
 Id. at 158 (citation omitted). 
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seek declaratory and injunctive relief against the owners of a waste 
treatment plant that was allegedly discharging illegal amounts of mercury 
into a local river.
30
  The plaintiffs had filed affidavits explaining how their 
fear of excessive mercury had limited their recreational use of the river.
31
  
The Court concluded that these “reasonable concerns” about pollution 
“directly affected [plaintiffs’] recreational, aesthetic, and economic 
interests” and therefore established injury-in-fact.32  The Court 
distinguished the plaintiffs’ declarations from declarations made by the 
plaintiffs in Lujan; the Lujan plaintiffs had failed to establish injury-in-
fact, the Court explained, because they made “conditional” statements 
about how they would “some day” visit areas affected by challenged 
government action.
33
  The Court distinguished Lyons, meanwhile, on the 
ground that the “unlawful conduct—discharging pollutants in excess of 
permit limits—was occurring at the time the complaint was filed.”34 
 
[12] The Court more recently found the risk of future harm to establish 
injury-in-fact in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms.
35
  The plaintiffs in 
Monsanto were a group of conventional alfalfa farmers who had 
challenged a government decision to deregulate a variety of genetically 
engineered alfalfa.
36
  The plaintiffs filed declarations stating that if the 
                                                 
30
 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 175–76, 
183, 189 (2000). 
 
31
 Id. at 181-83. 
 
32
 Id. at 184. 
 
33
 Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992)). 
 
34
 Id. at 184. 
 
35
 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 155 (2010).; see also Davis v. 
FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734–35 (2008)(finding standing based on future harm); Mass. v. 
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521–23 (2007)(finding standing based on future harm).  But see 
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 495–97 (2009) (rejecting argument of 
standing based on future harm). 
 
36
 Monsanto, 561 U.S. at 139. 
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deregulation proceeded their crops would be close enough to farms with 
the genetically engineered alfalfa that cross-pollination between the two 
varieties could occur.
37
  The Court held that the farmers had standing to 
seek injunctive relief because the “substantial risk” of gene flow would 
injure them in several ways, including by requiring them to test their 
alfalfa for genetically engineered crops and to take measures to minimize 
the risk of gene flow.
38
  The Court observed that the farmers would suffer 
these injuries from deregulation whether or not gene flow actually 
occurred.
39
 
 
[13] As these decisions indicate, the Supreme Court has articulated 
different formulations as to when a risk of future harm may constitute 
injury-in-fact.  Unsurprisingly, lower courts have done the same.  As 
commentators have noted, different circuits have applied arguably 
different substantive standards for determining whether a risk of future 
harm constitutes injury-in-fact under Article III.
40
  Some circuit decisions 
have stated that this risk of future injury must be “credible” or realistic.41  
Other circuits, meanwhile, have suggested that nearly any increase in a 
risk of future harm may be sufficient to establish injury-in-fact.  For 
example, the Second Circuit concluded in a 2003 decision that an 
“enhanced risk” of contracting food-borne illnesses established injury-in-
fact.
42
  The Seventh Circuit has stated “even a small probability of injury 
is sufficient to create a case or controversy.”43   
                                                 
37
 Id. at 153. 
 
38
 Id. at 153–54. 
 
39
 Id. at 155. 
 
40
 See F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 58 (2012). 
 
41
 See, e.g., Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 855 (6th Cir. 2006) (increased risk of 
harm must be “neither speculative nor remote”), vacated as moot by 473 F.3d 692, 694 
(6th Cir. 2007) (en banc); Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. Dep’t of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1161 
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (requiring plaintiff to establish “demonstrably increased risk” of harm); 
Cent. Delta Water Agency v. U.S., 306 F.3d 938, 950 (9th Cir. 2002) (requiring “credible 
threat of harm”).  
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B.  Clapper v. Amnesty International 
 
[14] With the foregoing cases as a backdrop, the Supreme Court again 
addressed the subject of standing and future harm in Clapper v. Amnesty 
International USA.
44
  At issue in Clapper were amendments to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”), which, among other things, 
regulates the government’s interception of communications for foreign 
intelligence purposes.
45
  Before the amendments’ enactment in 2008, 
section 702 of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a, allowed the government to 
conduct electronic foreign intelligence surveillance only if it could 
establish before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) that 
it had probable cause both that “the target of the electronic surveillance is 
a foreign power or [its] agent” and that each of the places to be monitored 
were being used by that foreign power or agent.
46
  The 2008 amendments 
replaced these requirements with a more permissive rule that the 
government need only use procedures “reasonably designed” to limit 
surveillance of United States citizens and to comply with the Fourth 
Amendment.
47
 
 
[15] The day the amendments were enacted, plaintiffs—a group of 
lawyers, journalists, and activists—filed suit seeking a declaration that the 
changes to FISA’s probable cause requirements were unconstitutional.48  
                                                                                                                         
42
 See Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 
43
 Am. Bottom Conservancy v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 650 F.3d 652, 658 (7th Cir. 
2011) (quoting Elk Grove Vill. v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993)). 
 
44
 Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
 
45
 Id. at 1140, 1147. 
 
46
 See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)(A)–(B) (2012).  
 
47
 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1145. 
 
48
 Id. at 1140, 1142. 
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The plaintiffs argued that they had standing to sue because their work 
“requires them to engage in sensitive international communications with 
individuals who they believe are likely targets of surveillance” under the 
amended FISA.
49
  They claimed that the amendments to § 1881a would 
compromise their ability to communicate with clients or sources and that 
the risk of surveillance under § 1881a would compel them to undertake 
“costly and burdensome measures,” including traveling abroad to meet 
clients in person, to protect confidentiality.
50
 
 
[16] While the district court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing, the 
Second Circuit reversed.
51
  According to the Second Circuit, the plaintiffs 
had standing due to the “objectively reasonable likelihood” that their 
communications would be subject to the newly authorized government 
surveillance.
52
  The plaintiffs also had standing, the Second Circuit 
explained, because their expenditures to avoid government surveillance 
were “present injuries” that stemmed “from a reasonable fear of future 
harmful government conduct.”53   
 
[17] The Supreme Court reversed.
54
  Justice Alito, writing for the 
majority, noted two aspects of the case that he viewed as counseling for a 
conservative approach to the standing issue.
55
  First, the plaintiffs’ suit 
challenged the constitutionality of actions taken by other branches of 
government.
56
  Second, their suit challenged actions of those branches “in 
                                                 
49
 Id. at 1142. 
 
50
 Id. at 1143. 
 
51
 Id. at 1155.  
 
52
 Amnesty Int’l U.S. v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 134 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 
53
 Id. at 138. 
 
54
 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1143.  
 
55
 Id. at 1147. 
 
56
 Id. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XXI, Issue 1 
 
 12 
the fields of intelligence gathering and foreign affairs.”57  Though not 
expressly incorporating these aspects of the case into the majority 
opinion’s subsequent standing analysis, Justice Alito noted that previous 
standing inquiries had been “especially rigorous” in the first category of 
cases,
58
 and that the Court had “often found a lack of standing” in the 
latter category.
59
 
 
[18] Turning first to the plaintiffs’ claim that they had standing because 
of the reasonable likelihood that they would be subject to government 
surveillance, Justice Alito concluded that the Second Circuit’s 
“objectively reasonable likelihood” standard was “too speculative to 
satisfy the well-established requirement that threatened injury must be 
‘certainly impending.’”60  While the majority opinion, citing language 
from previous decisions, left open the possibility that a “substantial risk” 
of future harm could also constitute injury-in-fact,
61
 Justice Alito 
concluded that the plaintiffs’ “attenuated chain of possibilities” would fail 
even that standard.
62
  According to Justice Alito, the plaintiffs’ theory of 
harm depended on the occurrence of no less than five successive events: 
(1) that the Government would target the plaintiffs’ clients or sources; (2) 
that this surveillance was authorized under § 1881a; (3) that the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court would approve such surveillance; (4) that 
the Government would succeed in carrying out the surveillance; and (5) 
that the Government would monitor plaintiffs’ own communications with 
those clients or sources.
63
 
                                                 
57
 Id. 
 
58
 Id. (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
59
 Id. at 1147. 
 
60
 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1143.  
 
61
 Id. at 1150 n.5. 
 
62
 Id. at 1148. 
 
63
 See id. at 1148–50. 
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[19] Turning next to the plaintiffs’ claim that they had and would 
continue to undertake burdensome measures to protect themselves from 
government surveillance, Justice Alito held that such measures were not 
traceable to § 1881a.
64
  Justice Alito rejected the Second Circuit’s 
conclusion that a litigant could establish standing by incurring costs to 
mitigate any fear of surveillance that was not “fanciful, paranoid, or 
otherwise unreasonable.”65  As Justice Alito explained, Article III did not 
allow the plaintiffs to “manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on 
themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not 
certainly impending.”66  The plaintiffs similarly could not establish 
standing on the basis of their clients’ reluctance to speak with them, 
because such behavior was “based on third parties’ subjective fear of 
surveillance.”67 
 
[20] Finally, Justice Alito distinguished several previous decisions 
where the Court had found standing based on a risk of future harm.
68
  
First, the majority explained that the Court’s prior decision in Laidlaw 
involved wrongdoing that all parties conceded was ongoing, whereas in 
the facts before it in Clapper the plaintiffs had not proven that the 
government was monitoring them under § 1881a.
69
  Second, the majority 
distinguished a First Amendment case, Meese v. Keene,
70
 which involved 
a plaintiff who desired to show three films labeled as “political 
propaganda,” and who was, unlike the Clapper plaintiffs, “unquestionably 
                                                 
64
 Id. at 1151. 
 
65
 Id. 
 
66
 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1151.  
 
67
 Id. at 1152 n.7. 
 
68
 Id. at 1153. 
 
69
 Id. at 1153. 
 
70
 Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987). 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XXI, Issue 1 
 
 14 
regulated” by the statute that he wished to challenge.71  Third, the majority 
noted that the plaintiffs in Geertson Seed Farms had demonstrated 
concrete facts showing that gene flow could occur between their alfalfa 
and genetically modified alfalfa, whereas the plaintiffs in Clapper “present 
no concrete evidence to substantiate their fears, but instead rest on mere 
conjecture about possible governmental actions.”72 
 
[21] The majority opinion concluded with a summary of its central 
holding: the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing “because they cannot 
demonstrate that the future injury they purportedly fear is certainly 
impending and because they cannot manufacture standing by incurring 
costs in anticipation of non-imminent harm.”73 
 
[22] Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan, dissented.
74
  According to Justice Breyer, the majority opinion, 
and in particular its reliance on the phrase “certainty impending,” set a 
stricter requirement for injury-in-fact based on a risk of future harm than 
had past cases.
75
  As Justice Breyer explained, “certainty is not, and never 
has been, the touchstone of standing.”76  Rather, “what the Constitution 
requires is something more akin to ‘reasonable probability’ or ‘high 
probability.’”77  For support, Justice Breyer gathered previous decisions 
from the Court where injury-in-fact had been found on the basis of, among 
                                                 
71
 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1153. 
 
72
 Id. at 1154 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2755 
(2010)).  
  
73
 Id. at 1155. 
 
74
 Id.  
 
75
 Id. at 1165. 
 
76
 Id. at 1160. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 
77
 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1165.  
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other things, “realistic,” “substantial,” and “reasonable” risks of harm.78  
His opinion further argued, citing to both Supreme Court and circuit court 
decisions, that “courts have often found probabilistic injuries sufficient to 
support standing.”79  Justice Breyer concluded that he would have found 
the plaintiffs in Clapper to possess Article III standing.
80
 
 
III.  INJURY-IN-FACT IN DATA BREACH AND DATA COLLECTION CASES 
[23] Over half a decade before the Supreme Court addressed Article III 
standing to challenge government collection of private information in 
Clapper, lower courts began addressing a separate, though closely related, 
issue: Article III standing to challenge private collection, retention, and 
disclosure of private information.  This section catalogs those cases and 
the different conclusions they have reached on the issue of standing; cases 
interpreting Clapper’s standing analysis are discussed in the following 
section. 
 
[24] This Article uses the terms “data breach cases” and “data 
collection cases” to describe the two different types of data privacy 
lawsuits that have emerged in recent years.  The term “data breach cases” 
refers to lawsuits arising from the defendant’s inadvertent loss or 
disclosure of a plaintiff’s PII.  Data breach cases generally focus on the 
increased risk of identity theft following a breach, and plaintiffs 
“customarily seek to recover their expenditures on credit monitoring, 
credit and debit card cancellation fees, and repayment for unauthorized 
charges.”81 
 
                                                 
78
 See id. at 1161–62. 
 
79
 Id. at 1162. 
 
85
 Id. at 1165. 
 
81
 Holmes v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 5:08-CV-00205-R, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
96587, at *10 (W.D. Ky. July 12, 2012). 
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[25] The term “data collection cases,” meanwhile, refers to lawsuits that 
arise from a defendant’s intentional collection, storage, or sharing of the 
plaintiff’s PII.  These cases most typically involve either information 
shared on social networking websites, information surreptitiously 
collected by Internet “cookies,” or information collected by smartphones 
or similar devices.  While some data collection cases also focus on the risk 
of identity theft, most are driven by more traditional privacy concerns; the 
PII at issue often includes the plaintiff’s shopping habits, web-browsing 
history, or even physical location.  The theories of liability in data 
collection lawsuits are more varied than in data breach lawsuits, with 
plaintiffs often seeking damages under breach-of-contract theories, state 
consumer protection laws, or federal statutes. 
 
[26] While data breach and data collection cases have raised a number 
of different legal issues, this Article focuses only on the issue of Article III 
standing.  Many of the decisions discussed below found plaintiffs to have 
standing but nonetheless dismissed their claims on substantive grounds.  
This includes decisions that concluded that, while the plaintiffs may have 
alleged an injury sufficient to satisfy Article III’s injury-in-fact 
requirement, they had not alleged an injury sufficient to satisfy the 
damages requirement of a state-law negligence or breach-of-contract 
claim.
82
 
 
A.  Data Breach Cases 
[27] Plaintiffs in data breach cases have advanced several different 
theories of injury-in-fact.  Most commonly, plaintiffs have contended that 
they suffered injury-in-fact from an increased risk of identity theft after 
their personal information has been compromised in a breach.  Most 
plaintiffs relatedly contend that expenses they have incurred to mitigate 
this risk—for example, credit monitoring or cancellation of credit cards—
constitute a separate basis for injury-in-fact.  A smaller number of 
                                                 
82
 See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 640 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that plaintiffs had standing but had not alleged damages that were compensable under 
Indiana law). 
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plaintiffs have argued that they have suffered injury-in-fact due to their 
anxiety and distress upon learning about the loss of their personal 
information.  Finally, some plaintiffs have sought to establish injury-in-
fact on the theory that the loss of their personal information breached an 
implied contract with the defendant.  This section assesses each theory in 
turn. 
1.  Increased Risk of Identity Theft and Measures 
Taken to Mitigate that Risk 
 
[28] Among plaintiffs’ arguments for injury-in-fact in data breach 
lawsuits, by far the most common are the related arguments that: (1) the 
plaintiff has suffered injury-in-fact due to an increased risk of future 
identity theft; and (2) the plaintiff has suffered injury-in-fact due to the 
expenses required to mitigate such risk of future identity theft.  Though 
they are distinct arguments, courts have generally treated these two 
theories of injury-in-fact as rising or falling with one another. 
 
[29] These theories of standing have achieved mixed results in lower 
courts.  While initial federal decisions were hostile to the idea that an 
increased risk of identity theft could constitute injury-in-fact, a shift 
occurred after the Seventh Circuit endorsed such a theory in Pisciotta v. 
Old National Bancorp.
83
  Despite more success for plaintiffs after 
Pisciotta, other courts have continued to find that an increased risk of 
identity theft does not establish injury-in-fact, including the Third Circuit 
in Reilly v. Ceridian Corp.
84
   
 
[30] Even though they have differed in their final conclusions, courts 
have been more consistent in identifying what factors are relevant to 
whether a plaintiff’s risk of future identity theft is either “real and 
imminent” or “conjectural and hypothetical.”  These factors include: (1) 
whether a data breach has actually occurred; (2) whether the data was lost 
or stolen; and (3) whether a third-party has actually used plaintiff’s 
                                                 
83
 Id. at 634. 
 
84
 Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 46 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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sensitive third-party information in a way that has caused the plaintiff 
harm. 
 
a.  Injury-in-Fact Where Breached Personal 
Information Has Been Used to Harm the 
Plaintiff 
 
[31] Courts have understandably found injury-in-fact in data breach 
cases where third parties actually use a plaintiff’s compromised personal 
information in a way that causes the plaintiff harm.  In Resnick v. AvMed, 
Inc. for example, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant, a health-services 
company, had two laptops stolen from it that contained unencrypted files 
with the plaintiffs’ health information, Social Security numbers, names, 
addresses, and phone numbers.
85
  Ten months after the theft, one plaintiff 
discovered that a third-party had used her name to open bank accounts, 
activate credit cards, and make an address change.
86
  Another plaintiff’s 
information was used to open a brokerage account.
87
  The Eleventh Circuit 
held that the plaintiffs had established injury-in-fact by “alleg[ing] that 
they have become victims of identity theft and have suffered monetary 
damages as a result.”88  The Eleventh Circuit expressly reserved judgment 
on whether any increased risk of future identity theft would also establish 
injury-in-fact.
89
 
 
                                                 
85
 Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 
86
 Id. 
 
87
 Id. 
 
88
 Id. at 1323. 
 
89
 Id. at 1323 n.1 (11th Cir. 2012); see also Burrows v. Purchasing Power, LLC, No. 
1:12-CV-22800-UU, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186556, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2012) 
(applying Resnick to conclude that plaintiff, who alleged that an unknown third-party 
used his personal information to file a federal tax return and obtain a tax refund, has 
alleged injury-in-fact). 
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[32] The Sixth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Lambert v. 
Hartman.
90
  The plaintiff in that case alleged that third parties had made 
purchases in her name after her personal information, including her Social 
Security number, was publicly posted on the Hamilton County, Ohio’s 
Clerk of Courts website.
91
  The Sixth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff 
had standing to pursue her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the county.
92
  
As the court explained, the plaintiff had alleged “that her identity was 
stolen and that her financial security and credit rating suffered as a 
result.”93  These “actual financial injuries” were “sufficient to meet the 
injury-in-fact requirement.”94  By contrast, the Sixth Circuit noted in dicta 
that the plaintiff’s allegation of an increased future risk of identity theft 
was “somewhat ‘hypothetical’ and ‘conjectural.’”95 
 
[33] Mere allegations of fraudulent credit card charges, however, may 
not necessarily establish injury-in-fact, even if traceable to the data breach 
at issue.  For example, in Willingham v. Global Payments, Inc., two 
plaintiffs alleged that they had discovered hundreds of dollars in 
fraudulent charges on their credit and debit cards following a data breach 
at the defendant company.
96
  Despite finding the charges “fairly traceable” 
to the data breach,
97
 the district court concluded that neither plaintiff had 
                                                 
90
 Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 437 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 
91
 Id. at 435–36.  The information had come from a traffic citation issued to the plaintiff.  
Id. at 435. 
 
92
 Id. at 438–39. 
 
93
 Id. at 437. 
 
94
 Id. 
 
95
 Id.  
 
96
 Willingham v. Global Payments, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-01157-RWS-JFK, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 27764, at *6–8 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2013). 
 
97
 Id. at *14 (quoting Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir. 2012)). 
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standing to sue.
98
  According to the court, the plaintiffs’ failure to plead 
that they either were not reimbursed for the charges or that they suffered 
other fees and expenses meant that they had not alleged identity theft in a 
way that created injury-in-fact.
99
  The decisions in Resnick and Lambert 
are arguably consistent with Willingham, as both involved injuries that 
went beyond fraudulent credit card charges: changes of address and 
opened bank accounts in Resnick, and alleged damage to the plaintiff’s 
credit score in Lambert. 
 
b.  Injury-in-Fact Where Data Has Been Stolen 
 
[34] After situations where actual identity theft has occurred and caused 
the plaintiff harm, courts are next most likely to find injury-in-fact where a 
third-party has either stolen data or accessed it without authorization.  
Courts generally recognize these scenarios as presenting a more real threat 
of identity theft than where sensitive information is accidentally posted 
online or a computer containing sensitive information is simply lost or 
misplaced. Additionally, courts are even more likely to find injury-in-fact 
when circumstances suggest that a third-party specifically sought the 
plaintiffs’ PII.  This includes situations where an unknown third-party 
purposefully acquires information through computer hacking or credit card 
skimming, as well as situations where plaintiffs have traced subsequent 
fraudulent activity to the breach. 
 
[35] These cases are also where the debate over Article III standing has 
most frequently arisen.  Decisions from the Seventh and Ninth Circuit 
have held that the risk of future identity theft is sufficiently imminent in a 
data-theft context to establish injury-in-fact, while the Third Circuit has 
                                                 
98
 Id. at *23–26. 
 
99
 Id. at *19–24.  But see Burrows v. Purchasing Power, LLC, No. 1:12-CV-22800-UU, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186556, at *7–9 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2012) (arguing that actual 
misuse of sensitive personal information even devoid of monetary loss is sufficient to 
confer standing).  A possible distinction between Willingham and Burrows is that the 
latter case involved unauthorized use of the plaintiff’s name and Social Security number, 
whereas the former appears to have only involved misuse of credit and debit card 
information. 
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held that it is not.
100
  While the Seventh, Ninth, and Third Circuit’s 
decisions are arguably factually distinguishable, they have contributed to a 
continuing split among district courts over whether standing exists in cases 
where a third-party purposefully compromises the plaintiff’s PII. 
 
[36] In Pisciotta, the Seventh Circuit held that an increased risk of 
future identity theft was sufficient to establish injury-in-fact for customers 
of a bank whose confidential records had been accessed by a third-party 
hacker.
101
  The nature of the unauthorized access “suggest[ed] that the 
intrusion was sophisticated, intentional, and malicious.”102  While the 
customers did not allege to have experienced any direct financial loss or 
actual identity theft, they argued that they still had standing to pursue their 
claims for credit monitoring costs due to their increased risk of suffering 
future identity theft and the expenses they incurred to mitigate that risk.
103
  
The Seventh Circuit agreed, and stated that “the injury-in-fact requirement 
can be satisfied by a threat of future harm or by an act which harms the 
plaintiff only by increasing the risk of future harm that the plaintiff would 
have otherwise faced, absent the defendant’s actions.”104 
 
[37] To support its conclusion, the court in Pisciotta cited to previous 
Seventh Circuit decisions stating that a mere risk of future harm was 
sufficient for injury-in-fact.
105
  The court also relied in part on decisions 
that endorsed Article III standing for medical monitoring claims in toxic 
                                                 
100
 Compare Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 44 (3d Cir. 2011), with Pisciotta v. 
Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007); and Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 
628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
 
101
 Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 631. 
 
102
 Id. at 632. 
 
103
 See id. 
 
104
 Id. at 634. 
 
105
 Id. at 634 n.4 (“[E]ven a small probability of injury is sufficient to create a case or 
controversy . . . .” (quoting Elk Grove Vill. v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993)). 
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tort and medical device cases.
106
  In discussing the separate issue of 
whether damages were available to the customers under Indiana law, the 
court described toxic tort medical monitoring cases as “somewhat 
analogous,” though it ultimately noted that Indiana had yet to recognize 
such claims.
107
 
 
[38] In Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., the Ninth Circuit also found an 
allegedly increased risk of future identity theft to be sufficient to establish 
injury-in-fact.
108
  The data breach in Krottner occurred when an unknown 
party stole a laptop with “unencrypted names, addresses, and social 
security numbers of approximately 97,000 Starbucks employees.”109  
While the plaintiffs did not allege that they had experienced any financial 
harm, one plaintiff alleged that someone had attempted to open a bank 
account with his social security number.
110
  The plaintiffs further alleged 
that they had and would continue to spend time and money monitoring 
their credit and finances for potential fraudulent activity.
111
  The Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had established injury-in-fact by 
alleging a “credible threat of harm.”112  The court noted that the risk of 
future harm had been sufficient to support standing in both the 
environmental
113
 and toxic tort
114
 contexts, as well as in the data breach 
                                                 
106
 See id. n.3 (citing Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 264–65 (2nd Cir. 
2006); Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 574–75 (6th Cir. 2005)); see also 
Graves, supra note 12, at ¶ 12 (explaining that medical monitoring claims seek “recovery 
of the costs of medical tests designed to detect and prevent the onset of diseases resulting 
from [the] . . . defendant’s actions.”).   
 
107
 Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 638–39.  
 
108
 Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 
109
 Id. at 1140. 
 
110
 Id. at 1141. 
 
111
 Id. 
 
112
 Id. at 1143 (quoting Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 950 
(9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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context with Pisciotta.
115
  It observed by way of contrast that “[w]ere 
Plaintiffs-Appellants’ allegations more conjectural or hypothetical—for 
example, if no laptop had been stolen, and Plaintiffs had sued based on the 
risk that it would be stolen at some point in the future—we would find the 
threat far less credible.”116 
 
[39] The Third Circuit, meanwhile, has held an increased risk of future 
identity theft to not be sufficient to support a finding of injury-in-fact in a 
data breach lawsuit.  In Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., it declined to find 
standing for customers of a payroll processing firm whose financial 
records had been accessed by a third-party.
 117
  According to the Third 
Circuit, the plaintiffs’ increased risk of identity theft was “hypothetical” 
and “dependent on entirely speculative, future actions of an unknown 
third-party.”118  The Third Circuit distinguished both Pisciotta and 
Krottner as involving clearer indicia of potential identity theft: the 
intrusion in Pisciotta was “sophisticated, intentional and malicious,” and 
someone had actually attempted to open a bank account with stolen 
personal information in Krottner.
119
  The Third Circuit viewed these facts 
as demonstrating a more “imminent” and “certainly impending” harm than 
the present case, where there was “no evidence that the intrusion was 
intentional or malicious.”120 
 
                                                                                                                         
113
 Id. at 1142 (citing Cent. Delta Water Agency, 306 F.3d 938, 948–50 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 
114
 Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1142 (citing Pritikin v. Dep’t of Energy, 254 F.3d 791, 796–97 
(9th Cir. 2001)). 
 
115
 Id. (citing Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007)). 
 
116
 Id. at 1143. 
 
117
 Reilly v. Ceridian, 664 F.3d 38, 40–42 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 
118
 Id. at 42. 
 
119
 Id. at 43–44 (quoting Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 632). 
 
120
 Id. at 44. 
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[40] Although distinguishing Pisciotta and Krottner, the Third Circuit 
also expressed skepticism of both decisions’ standing analyses, and 
particularly of their citation to toxic tort and medical device cases.
121
  In 
the Third Circuit’s view, an analogy to those cases was unfounded for at 
least two reasons.  First, while in toxic tort and medical monitoring cases 
“an injury has undoubtedly occurred,” in data breach cases “where no 
misuse is alleged,” no such injury has occurred.122  Second, medical 
device and toxic tort cases, as well as environmental cases, involved 
human health concerns often not redressable after the fact.
123
  Finally, the 
court concluded that any expenditure by the plaintiffs to mitigate potential 
identity theft did not convert their hypothetical injury into an “actual or 
imminent” one.124  According to the court, the plaintiffs had not spent 
money due to any actual injury, but rather “prophylactically spent money 
to ease fears of future third-party criminality.”125 
 
[41] District courts have likewise reached differing conclusions about 
injury-in-fact when a data breach occurs in a manner that suggests 
potential identity theft.  An earlier Southern District of Ohio decision 
concluded that a risk of future identity theft was too conjectural to support 
standing
126
 in a case where “unauthorized persons obtained access to and 
acquired the information of approximately 96,000 customers” of the 
retailer DSW, Inc.
127
  In that case, the plaintiff alleged her “potential 
injury [was] contingent upon her information being obtained and then used 
by an unauthorized person for an unlawful purpose,” but had “not alleged 
evidence that a third party intends to make unauthorized use of her 
                                                 
121
 See id. 
 
122
 Id. at 4.  
 
123
 Reilly, 664 F.3d. at 45–46. 
 
124
 Id. at 46. 
 
125
 Id. 
 
126
 See Key v. DSW Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 684, 688–89 (S.D. Ohio 2006). 
 
127
 Id. at 686. 
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financial information or of her identity.”128  The court also found medical 
monitoring cases inapposite, partially because they were “not inextricably 
linked to the possible criminal actions of unknown third parties at some 
unidentified point in the indefinite future.”129 
 
[42] An Eastern District of Missouri court reached a similar conclusion 
in Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc.
130
  In that case, hackers had accessed 
confidential information in the defendant company’s possession and 
attempted to extort the company with its threatened release.
131
  The court 
nonetheless concluded that the plaintiff—who did not know for certain 
whether his personal data had been compromised and alleged only “an 
increased risk of identify [sic] theft at an unknown point in the future”—
had not shown injury-in-fact.
132
  According to the court, “many ‘if’s’ 
would have to come to pass” for the plaintiff to suffer identity theft, 
including the compromise of his data, the obtaining of that data by a third-
party, and the use of that data to commit identity theft.
133
  These events 
were, in the court’s view, all hypothetical and speculative.134 
 
[43] Similarly, in Willingham v. Global Payments, Inc., a case where 
plaintiffs alleged that they had actually experienced fraudulent credit and 
debit card charges following a security breach,
135
 the Northern District of 
                                                 
128
 Id. at 690.  
 
129
 Id. at 691. 
 
130
 See Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1053 (E.D. Mo. 2009) 
(citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
 
131
 Id. at 1049. 
 
132
 Id. at 1053 (citing Johnson v. Missouri, 142 F.3d 1087, 1089–90). 
 
133
 Id. at 1053. 
 
134
 See id. 
 
135
 Willingham v. Global Payments, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-01157-RWS-JFK, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 27764, at *6–7 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2013). 
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Georgia concluded that the risk of future identity theft likely was not 
sufficiently “imminent” to establish injury-in-fact.136  Citing to Reilly, the 
court noted that the plaintiffs’ alleged risk of future identity theft was 
“dependent on entirely speculative, future actions of an unknown third-
party.”137 
 
[44] By contrast, the Southern District of California found injury-in-fact 
to have been alleged when customers of Sony brought suit after hackers 
accessed Sony’s computer networks and stole sensitive personal 
information from millions of accounts.
138
  Following Krottner as binding 
authority, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had alleged injury-in-fact 
because they had alleged “that their sensitive Personal Information was 
wrongfully disseminated, thereby increasing the risk of future harm.”139  
Similarly, the Western District of Kentucky found injury-in-fact when 
plaintiffs, customers of a bank whose former employee had stolen 
confidential information on 2.4 million individuals and “passed the data 
on to known and unknown third parties in exchange for payments of 
$70,000,” alleged that automobile loans had been applied for in their 
names or that their home had been “bombarded” with telemarketing 
calls.
140
  According to the court, the plaintiffs established injury by taking 
reasonable steps to mitigate the harms of the employee’s actions, 
including purchasing credit monitoring and cancelling their home phone 
service.
141
  
                                                 
136
 Id. at *23–25 (recommending the plaintiffs' complaint be dismissed for failure to state 
a claim and the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction be denied as moot). 
 
137
 Id. at *20 (quoting Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
138
 In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 903 F. Supp. 2d 
942, 950–51, 958 (S.D. Cal. 2012). 
 
139
 Id. at 958 (citing Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
 
140
 Holmes v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 5:08-CV-00205-R, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
96587, at *4–5, *12 (W.D. Ky. July 12, 2012). 
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[45] Courts have also reached differing conclusions when, like in 
Reilly, data has been stolen but nothing suggests that it was the thief’s 
specific target.
142
  A good example of the difference that the apparent 
motives and capabilities of a data hacker can have on a court’s standing 
analysis is Allison v. Aetna, Inc.
143
  In that case hackers managed to gain 
access to Aetna’s job application data base, which contained the sensitive 
information of over 450,000 applicants, including the plaintiff’s.144  While 
Aetna confirmed that the hackers obtained the e-mail addresses of some 
applicants, it was unclear whether they obtained any other information; the 
hackers later sent “phishing” e-mails to job applicants asking them for 
more personal information.
145
  The plaintiff could not confirm that his e-
mail was among the ones stolen, and he had not received a phishing e-
mail.
146
  The district court concluded that his alleged increased risk of 
future identity theft, along with the steps he had taken to mitigate that risk, 
were “far too speculative” and could not establish injury-in-fact.147  The 
court noted, among other things, that the hackers’ phishing e-mails 
suggested that they in fact lacked the necessary information to commit 
identity theft, thus distinguishing the case from the more “sophisticated” 
hacking operation in Pisciotta.
148
 
                                                                                                                         
141
 Id. at *12 (citing Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 437 (6th Cir. 2008); Pisciotta v. 
Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007)). 
 
142
 See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 40, 44 (3d Cir. 2011).  
 
143
 See Allison v. Aetna, Inc., No. 09-2560, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22373, at *18– 
21 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2010). 
 
144
 See id. at *1–3. 
 
145
 See id. at *2–3. 
 
146
 See id. at *3. 
 
147
 Id. at *18–21. 
 
148
 See Allison, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22373, at *24 (citing Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l 
Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 632).  
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[46] In Randolph v. ING Life Insurance & Annuity Co., burglars stole a 
laptop containing the names, addresses, and Social Security numbers of 
13,000 current and former employees of the District of Columbia.
149
  The 
district court concluded that the risk of future identity theft was too 
speculative for a finding of injury-in-fact, based either on that risk alone or 
on the steps the plaintiffs had taken to mitigate the risk.
150
  Since the 
plaintiffs had not alleged that the burglar was specifically after their 
personal information, this meant that their allegations were “mere 
speculation that at some unspecified point in the indefinite future they will 
be the victims of identity theft.”151  The district court remanded the case to 
state court, where it eventually reached the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals.
152
  The Court of Appeals issued its own opinion, which, while 
not squarely ruling on the standing issue (it dismissed the plaintiffs’ 
complaint for failure to state a claim), criticized the district court’s 
approach and suggested that injury-in-fact would be “fairly easily 
satisfied” by the plaintiffs’ statutory and tort claims,153 particularly in light 
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Doe v. Chao.154 
 
[47] Two other decisions, facing similar facts, reached the opposite 
conclusion and held that a threat of future identity theft did establish 
injury-in-fact.  In Caudle v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., a 
                                                 
149
 See Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2007).  
 
150
 See id. at 7–8.  
 
151
 Id.; see also Hinton v. Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., No. 09-594 (MLC), 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 20675, at *1, *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 16, 2009) (dismissing a “rambling” pro se 
complaint alleging that defendant had lost Plaintiff’s sensitive personal information in a 
data breach where Plaintiff’s “allegations of injuries amount to nothing more than mere 
speculation”). 
 
152
 See Randolph, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 11. 
  
153
 Randolph, 973 A.2d at 707. 
 
154
 See id. (citing Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004)); see also infra section III.A.2 
(discussing Doe v. Chao). 
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pension consulting company had several laptops containing sensitive 
personal information stolen from its office, but “[n]othing in the record 
shed[] light on whether the laptops were stolen for their intrinsic value, for 
the value of the data or for both.”155  The district court, citing Pisciotta and 
drawing an analogy to toxic tort cases, held that the threat of future 
identity theft faced by the plaintiffs was sufficient to establish standing.
156
  
In Ruiz v. Gap Inc., two laptops containing the unencrypted sensitive 
personal information of over 800,000 Gap job applicants, including the 
plaintiff, were stolen from a Gap vendor.
 157
  The district court concluded 
that the plaintiff’s allegation of an increased future risk of identity theft 
was sufficient to establish injury-in-fact at the motion-to-dismiss stage, 
though it suggested that more concrete allegations would be needed for the 
case to move forward.
158
  When the defendants later brought motions for 
summary judgment, the court again found standing based on an increased 
risk of identity theft,
159
 even though it was “less clear than it was in 
Pisciotta that the thief was targeting the plaintiff’s personal 
information.”160  The court granted summary judgment, however, on the 
merits of the plaintiff’s claims.161  The Ninth Circuit affirmed both the 
district court’s rulings on standing and on the merits.162 
                                                 
155
 Caudle v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 273, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008). 
 
156
 See id. at 279–80 (citing Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 
2007); LaFleur v. Whitman, 300 F.3d 256, 270 (2d Cir. 2002)). 
 
157
 See Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1124–25 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 
158
 See id. at 1125–26. 
 
159
 See Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 908, 911–13 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 
160
 Id. at 912.  The court noted, however, statistical evidence provided by the plaintiff that 
19% of Americans notified of a data breach during the previous year had reported 
becoming victims of identity theft, while only 4.32% of Americans generally did so.  Id. 
at 913. 
 
161
 Id. at 918.  
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c.  Injury-in-Fact Where Plaintiffs’ Data Has 
Otherwise Been Exposed or Lost 
[48] In contrast to cases where sensitive data has been stolen, courts 
have been less likely to find injury-in-fact due to an increased risk of 
identity theft where sensitive data has simply been lost or inadvertently 
exposed.  Still, even in these factual situations, courts have reached 
differing conclusions about whether a risk of future identity theft is 
sufficiently imminent to establish injury-in-fact under Article III. 
 
[49] Some courts have refused to find injury-in-fact where sensitive 
data has been exposed, but not necessarily exposed to criminal parties.  In 
one of the first cases to consider data breach lawsuits and Article III 
standing, a district court held that an alleged increased risk of future 
identity theft did not support injury-in-fact where the plaintiff’s personal 
information had been accessed by a company’s client without 
authorization and sold to a marketing company.
163
  The plaintiff did not 
plead that, in the three years since the breach, she had either received junk 
mail or suffered an identity theft.
164
  Likewise, a bankruptcy court found 
no injury-in-fact where a creditor posted a proof of claim, which remained 
public for six days, containing the debtor’s Social Security number, 
driver’s license number, and date of birth.165  The court concluded on 
summary judgment that the risk of identity theft was neither actual nor 
                                                                                                                         
162
 See Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 380 F. App’x 689, 690–91 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Ruiz alleged, with 
support from an expert affidavit, that he was at greater risk of identity theft.  As the 
district court properly concluded, this alleged prospective injury presents enough of a risk 
that the concerns of plaintiffs are real, and not merely speculative.”).  
 
163
 See Bell v. Acxiom Corp., No. 4:06CV00485-WRW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72477, 
at *1–3 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 3, 2006). 
 
164
 See id. at *8. 
 
165
 See Davis v. Eagle Legacy Credit Union, 430 B.R. 902, 905, 907 (Bankr. D. Colo. 
2010). 
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imminent, as the debtor provided no proof that the information had been 
accessed by any unauthorized party.
166
 
 
[50] Other district courts have similarly refused to find injury-in-fact 
established where files containing sensitive personal information were lost 
in transit. In Giordano v. Wachovia Securities, LLC, a package with 
financial information of tens of thousands of the defendant’s customers 
was lost in the mail.
 167
  The district court concluded that plaintiffs’ 
alleged increased risk of identity theft was “speculative and hypothetical” 
and did not establish injury-in-fact.
168
  The court rejected the argument 
that the case was analogous to medical monitoring cases.
169
  Likewise, in 
Hammond v. The Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., the defendant company lost 
a metal box containing six to ten computer back-up tapes with the 
unencrypted sensitive personal information of over 12.5 million 
individuals.
170
  Three plaintiffs alleged that they experienced 
“unauthorized credit transactions” after the tapes were lost.171  The district 
court held that the plaintiffs’ injury was speculative and conjectural, and 
noted that it found the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Pisciotta 
unpersuasive.
172
 
                                                 
166
 See id. at 907. 
 
167
 Giordano v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, No. 06-476 (JBS), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52266, at 
*3–4 (D.N.J. July 31, 2006). 
 
168
 Id. at *12. 
 
169
 Id. at *11 n.4.  
 
170
 Hammond v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 08 Civ. 6060 (RMB) (RLE), 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 71996, at *9–10, *14-15 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010). 
 
171
 Id. at *17. 
 
172
 See id. at *23, *28; see also Whitaker v. Health Net of Cal. Inc., No. CIV S-11-0910 
KJM-DAD, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6545, at *5, *9 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2012) (declining 
to find standing where defendant lost several hard drives containing personal information 
of over 800,000 individuals, including plaintiffs, but plaintiffs had alleged no misuse of 
their information and distinguishing the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Krottner and Ruiz as 
involving “the theft of information, not its loss”). 
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[51] By contrast, in another lawsuit stemming from the same data 
breach as Hammond, a district court found injury-in-fact to be present.
173
  
In McLoughlin v. People’s United Bank, Inc., which involved the same 
loss of back-up tapes as in Hammond, the court concluded that an 
increased risk of future identity theft was sufficient to confer Article III 
standing.
174
  Unlike in Hammond, the court cited Pisciotta’s standing 
analysis favorably.
175
  
 
d.  Injury-in-Fact Where No Data Breach Has 
Occurred 
 
[52] Finally, others decisions have considered—and rejected—Article 
III standing where plaintiffs have alleged not that their personal 
information had been compromised in a breach, but only that a defendant 
company’s lax security practices created an intolerable likelihood that 
such a breach would occur.   
 
[53] In Katz v. Pershing, LLC, a brokerage firm customer alleged that 
the defendant, a company that provided various back-office services to the 
brokerage firm, used inadequate privacy measures and had exposed her 
sensitive personal information to anyone with access to the defendant’s 
computer network, including other customers.
176
  The First Circuit 
concluded that without an actual identified unauthorized use of her data, 
the plaintiff could not establish injury-in-fact on the theory of an increased 
risk of identity theft or of expenses made to mitigate that risk.
177
  More 
                                                 
173
 See McLoughlin v. People’s United Bank, Inc., No. 3:08-CV-00944(VLB), 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 78065, at *1–2, *13 (D. Conn. Aug. 31, 2009). 
 
174
 See id. at *3, *7–13. 
 
175
 See id. at *11–12 (citing Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp., 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 
2007)). 
 
176
 See Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 69–70 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 
177
 Id. at 79. 
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recently, in Hammer v. Sam’s East, Inc., customers of the retail chain 
Sam’s Club alleged that the company had made “numerous 
misrepresentations” about how it protects its customers’ sensitive 
information.
178
  The customers made “no allegation that their personal 
information has been stolen, compromised, or fraudulently used,” nor did 
they “allege that a security breach has occurred.”179  The district court held 
that the customers’ alleged injury was too speculative and noted that “no 
court has found that a mere increased risk of identity theft or fraud 
constitutes an injury in fact for standing purposes without some alleged 
theft of personal data or security breach.”180 
 
[54] Plaintiffs have brought similar claims in data collection cases: that 
a company’s collection or transmittal of the plaintiffs’ personal 
information, often without encryption, constitutes injury-in-fact due to the 
creation of an unreasonable risk of unauthorized use.
181
  Courts have 
generally rejected this theory of standing.
182
  As these cases involve 
allegations of either data collection by the Defendant itself or transfer of 
                                                 
178
 Hammer v. Sam's East, Inc., No. 12-CV-2618-CM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98707, at 
*2 (D. Kan. July 16, 2013). 
 
179
 Id. at *3. 
 
180
 Id. at *7–8 (citing Katz v. Pershing, 672 F.3d 64, 79 (1st Cir. 2012)). 
 
181
 See, e.g., Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc., No. 11-CV-03113 JSW, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 42691, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) (allegation that Defendant’s collection 
and storage of Plaintiff’s personal identifying information, without anonymization, 
creates a substantive risk of future harm).   
 
182
 See id. at *15–16; Hernandez v. Path, Inc., No. 12-CV-01515 YGR, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 151035, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2012) (citing Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 
F.3d 1139, 1141–43 (9th Cir. 2010)); Goodman v. HTC Am., Inc., No. C11-1793MJP, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88496, at *19–20 (W.D. Wash. June 26, 2012) (citing Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)); Low v. Linkedin Corp., No. 11-CV-01468-LHK, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130840, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2011).  But see In re iPhone 
Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding, with little 
discussion, that the “increased, unexpected, and unreasonable risk to the security of 
sensitive personal information” allegedly surreptitiously transferred from Defendant to 
third-party advertisers created “actual injury”). 
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information to third-party advertisers, courts have found that, even under 
Krottner, any fear of future identity theft is simply too speculative.
183
  
Perhaps equally importantly, courts have noted that the information at 
issue in these cases is often not sensitive financial information.
184
 
 
2.  Mental Distress About Identity Theft 
[55] A few plaintiffs in data breach cases have argued that they suffered 
injury-in-fact due to anxiety and emotional distress caused by knowing 
that they are at an increased risk of future identity theft.  Much like the 
theory that expenses incurred to mitigate the risk of identity theft can 
establish standing, this argument has risen or fallen with courts’ 
assessments of the underlying likelihood of identity theft actually 
occurring.  Thus, Krottner, which found an increased risk of future 
identity theft sufficient to establish injury-in-fact, also found that an 
allegation of “generalized anxiety and stress” resulting from the data 
breach constituted “present injury” that was “sufficient to confer 
standing.”185  But Reilly, which did not find an increased risk of identity 
theft to itself establish injury-in-fact, rejected the argument that the 
plaintiffs’ emotional distress about identity theft established injury-in-
fact.
186
 
                                                 
183
 See, e.g., Goodman, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88496, at *21–22 (finding Plaintiff’s 
theory of harm too speculative to establish injury-in-fact and distinguishing Krottner 
because “Plaintiffs do not allege that their personal data has been stolen, only that is 
susceptible to theft”). 
 
184
 See Yunker, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42691, at *16 (noting that Plaintiff “does not 
allege that he disclosed sensitive financial information, such as a social security number 
or a credit card number”); see also In re Linkedin User Privacy Litig., 932 F. Supp. 2d 
1089, 1094–95 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (holding that public posting of Plaintiff’s LinkedIn 
password did not amount “to a legally cognizable injury, such as, for example, identify 
[sic] theft or the theft of her personally identifiable information”). 
 
185
 Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010); see also 
McLoughlin v. People’s United Bank, Inc., No. 3:08-cv-00944(VLB), 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 78065, at *9 (D. Conn. Aug. 31, 2009) (citing Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 
F.3d 253, 264 (2d Cir. 2006)) (noting that “the fear or anxiety of future harm” can 
constitute injury-in-fact). 
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[56] While these cases may suggest that an emotional distress argument 
is unlikely to succeed as a standalone basis for injury-in-fact, potentially 
complicating the matter is the Supreme Court’s decision in Doe v. Chao. 
The plaintiff in Doe had filed for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits 
Act and later learned that the Department of Labor had inadvertently 
disclosed his Social Security number in hearing notices sent to multiple 
parties.
187
  The plaintiff brought suit against the federal government under 
the Privacy Act,
188
 but did not provide any proof of injury other than 
allegations that he was “torn . . . all to pieces” and “greatly concerned and 
worried” about the disclosure of his Social Security number.189  The 
Supreme Court did not address Article III standing, but clearly assumed 
that such standing was present: its opinion focused instead on whether the 
plaintiff had stated a claim under the Privacy Act.
190
  In her dissenting 
opinion, Justice Ginsburg characterized the majority as having found that 
“Doe has standing to sue” based on his alleged emotional injury.191 
 
[57] This issue of standing and emotional harm came up in a 
subsequent Privacy Act case, American Federation of Government 
Employees v. Hawley. The claims in Hawley were brought by 
Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) employees after the TSA 
lost a hard drive containing sensitive personal information on over 
100,000 current and former employees.
192
  Bringing suit under the Privacy 
Act, the employees alleged to have suffered injury in the form of, among 
other things, “embarrassment, inconvenience, mental distress, concern for 
                                                                                                                         
186
 See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 44–45 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 
187
 See Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 616–17 (2004). 
 
188
 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2012). 
 
189
 Chao, 540 U.S. at 617–18 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
190
 See id. at 616. 
 
191
 Id. at 641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 
192
 See AFGE v. Hawley, 543 F. Supp. 2d 44, 45 (D.D.C. 2008). 
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identity theft, concern for damage to credit report . . . [and] mental distress 
due to the possibility of security breach at airports.”193  The district court 
agreed that these allegations of mental distress “alleged injury . . . not 
speculative nor dependent on any future event, such as a third party’s 
misuse of the data.”194  While the court did not cite to Chao in its standing 
analysis, it did cite to another Privacy Act case.
195
 
 
[58] Yet in In re Science Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape 
Data Theft Litigation, another judge on the same court reached a different 
conclusion.  The litigation in SAIC arose from the theft of several data 
tapes that contained personal information and medical records of 4.7 
million U.S. military members and their families.
196
  But the tapes did not 
appear to be the target of the theft (they were stolen from a car along with 
a GPS system and a stereo), and accessing their information required 
specialized computer equipment.
197
  The district court held that the 
plaintiffs could not bring a Privacy Act claim because they could not 
allege “that their information has been exposed in a way that would 
facilitate easy, imminent access.”198  The court distinguished Chao on the 
ground that the plaintiff’s information in that case had actually been 
published on documents that were sent to third-parties.
199
 
 
[59] Courts have also cited to Chao in cases not involving the Privacy 
Act.  Despite Doe’s lack of discussion on the issue of standing, the Ninth 
                                                 
193
 Id. at 50–51 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
194
 Id. at 51. 
 
195
 Id. n.12 (quoting Krieger v. Dep’t of Justice, 529 F. Supp. 2d 29, 53 (D.D.C. 2008)). 
 
196
 See In re. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., No. 12-
347 (JEB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64125, at *5–6 (D.D.C. May 9, 2014).  
 
197
 Id. at *5, *10. 
 
198
 Id. at *35. 
 
199
 See id. at *36 (citing Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 617 (2004)). 
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Circuit in Krottner cited it in support of its own holding and characterized 
the decision as “suggesting” that the plaintiff’s alleged emotional distress 
had established Article III standing.
200
  The District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals also cited to Doe in its discussion of injury-in-fact in Randolph, 
albeit not in connection to claims of emotional distress.
201
 
 
3.  Breach of an Implied Contract 
 
[60] Finally, some plaintiffs in data breach cases have attempted to 
establish injury-in-fact under the theory that the data breach was itself a 
breach of an implied contract between them and the defendant, whereby 
the defendant, in return for some sort of consideration, had agreed to take 
reasonable measures to protect the plaintiffs’ sensitive personal 
information.  Most commonly, plaintiffs have argued that they believed 
reasonable protection of their sensitive personal information was included 
in the price they paid for the defendant’s goods or services. 
 
[61] Some courts have recognized that this theory of injury, if pled 
correctly, can establish injury-in-fact.  The First Circuit, for example, has 
twice recognized implied contract claims in data breach cases.
202
  It held 
in Katz that a breach-of-contract claim could establish injury-in-fact, 
although the court quickly dismissed the contract claim in Katz on 
substantive grounds.
203
  The court held in another case, Anderson v. 
Hannaford Bros. Co., that under Maine law a jury could reasonably find 
the existence of an implied contract between a grocery store and its 
customers that the store “would not use the credit card data for other 
people’s purchases, would not sell the data to others, and would take 
                                                 
200
 See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Chao, 
540 U.S. at 617–18, 624–25). 
 
201
 See Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 973 A.2d 702, 706–07 (D.C. 2009) 
(citing Doe, 540 U.S. at 621). 
 
202
 See infra notes 215–16. 
 
203
 See Katz v. Pershing, 672 F.3d 64, 72 (1st Cir. 2012). 
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reasonable measures to protect the information.”204  Anderson did not 
discuss Article III standing.
205
 
 
[62] By contrast, in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, the Northern 
District of Illinois rejected the notion that an implied breach-of-contract 
claim could establish injury-in-fact for data breach plaintiffs.
206
  The 
plaintiffs in Remijas had argued that the prices they paid for goods at the 
defendant’s department store included a “premium” for proper data 
security measures.
207
  The court dismissed this theory on the ground that, 
unlike in other implied contract cases, the alleged deficiency in data 
security measures was “extrinsic” to the products purchased by 
defendants.
208
   
 
[63] While establishing injury-in-fact from a breach of contract may be 
possible for data breach plaintiffs, successfully pleading such a theory has 
proven much more difficult.  In In re Linkedin User Privacy Litigation, the 
plaintiffs, paying members of LinkedIn’s services, alleged that LinkedIn 
had breached an implied contract to adequately protect their sensitive 
information.
209
  Dismissing this claim, the court noted that LinkedIn’s 
                                                 
204
 Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151, 159 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 
205
 See also Doe 1 v. AOL, LLC, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding 
that plaintiffs had Article III standing to pursue a consumer protection claim against 
AOL, which had publically posted their Internet search histories).  Though the rationale 
for Doe 1’s finding of injury-in-fact was not entirely clear, the court did agree with 
plaintiffs’ claim that “AOL’s collection and disclosure of members’ undeniably sensitive 
information is not something that members bargained for when they signed up and paid 
fees for AOL’s service.”  Id. at 1111.  
 
206
 See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, No. 14 C 1735, 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
129574, at *13–14 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 16, 2014).  
 
207
 See id. at *4. 
 
208
 See id. at *5; see also infra section II.B.2 (cataloguing some disagreement between 
data collection cases over whether a breach-of-contract theory supports injury-in-fact). 
 
209
 In re Linkedin User Privacy Litig., 932 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
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privacy policy and user agreement were the same for both paying and non-
paying members, thus precluding any argument that the policies went to 
the basis of the parties’ bargain.210  Likewise, in In re Barnes & Noble Pin 
Pad Litigation, the district court held that plaintiffs, whose credit card 
numbers had been skimmed from Barnes & Noble pin pad machines, had 
failed to plead injury-in-fact premised on the theory that the prices they 
paid for Barnes & Noble goods implicitly included a promise to 
adequately protect their financial information.
211
  As the court noted, 
Barnes & Noble charged the same price for its products whether payment 
was made with a credit card or in cash.
212
 
 
B.  Data Collection Cases 
[64] Unlike data breach cases, data collection cases do not focus on the 
occurrence or possibility of unauthorized third-party access to sensitive 
personal data in the defendant’s possession.  Rather, they focus on 
allegedly unauthorized collection or transmittal of personal information 
conducted by the defendant itself.  In the most common data collection 
cases, plaintiffs allege that the defendant, typically a social-media website 
or other Internet business, has surreptitiously transmitted their personally 
identifiable information to third-party advertisers seeking to exploit it for 
marketing purposes. 
 
                                                 
210
 See id. at 1093. The court also noted that the Plaintiffs had failed to allege in their 
complaint that they had actually read LinkedIn’s privacy policy.  Id. 
 
211
 See In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No. 12-CV-8617, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
125730, at *14–15 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2013). 
 
212
 See id. at *15; cf. Hammer v. Sam’s East, Inc., No. 12-CV-2618-CM, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 98707, at *8 n.5 (D. Kan. July 16, 2013) (dismissing plaintiff’s argument of 
standing based on payment of excessive fees where complaint failed to allege that such 
fees were actually paid or that Defendant’s actions reduced the value of the services 
received for the fees); McLoughlin v. People’s United Bank, Inc., No. 3:08-CV-00944 
(VLB), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78065, at *24 (D. Conn. Aug. 31, 2009) (dismissing 
plaintiff’s argument of standing based on payment of excessive fees to defendant due to 
the complaint’s failure to mention any such fees). 
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[65] Data collection cases differ from data breaches in significant ways, 
many of which impact courts’ standing analyses.  First, data collection and 
data breach cases often involve different types of parties.  Data collection 
cases generally do not involve the transfer of data to criminal third parties 
or other entities that are likely to use it to commit identity theft, but rather 
involve the transfer of PII to businesses seeking to use it for advertising 
and marketing purposes.  Second, data collection and data breach cases 
often involve different types of information.  Plaintiffs in data collection 
cases rarely allege that sensitive financial information—Social Security 
numbers, credit card numbers—have been illegally used by the Defendant.  
Rather, they more typically allege the illegal use of information such as 
names, addresses, Internet browsing history, and physical location.  This 
information’s disclosure poses much less of a threat of identity theft, but 
much more of a threat of embarrassment or violation of other traditional 
privacy notions. 
 
[66] Plaintiffs in data collection cases have advanced several different 
theories of injury-in-fact, including: (1) that the unauthorized use of their 
PII deprived them of that information’s economic value; (2) that the 
unauthorized use of their PII constituted a breach of contract; (3) that the 
unauthorized collection or transmittal of PII from their phones negatively 
impacted the phones’ performance; (4) that the unauthorized use of PII 
caused emotional harm; (5) that the unauthorized use of PII required 
expenditures to prevent that use; and (6) that injury-in-fact is established 
by various computer and privacy statutes.  As explained below, these 
theories have achieved varying levels of success. 
 
[67] Also worth noting is that data collection cases have an even more 
recent history than data breach cases.  The vast majority of data collection 
cases have taken place in district courts in the Ninth Circuit, most notably 
the Northern District of California (home of Silicon Valley and many of 
the country’s largest technology firms).  Consequently, a decision from the 
Ninth Circuit could abruptly and dramatically shift the current landscape 
of Article III standing in these cases. 
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1.  Economic Value of PII 
 
[68] One of the most common, but least successful, arguments for 
injury-in-fact made by data collection plaintiffs is that the unauthorized 
collection or transmittal of their PII deprives them of that information’s 
inherent economic value.  This argument is premised on the idea that the 
type of information collected by defendants in these cases—names, e-mail 
addresses, demographic information, Internet browsing and shopping 
history—has economic value that advertising and marketing companies 
are willing to pay for, at least in the aggregate.  Plaintiffs argue that by 
taking this information without authorization, defendants have deprived 
them of the opportunity to exploit the economic value of this information 
themselves. 
 
[69] While courts have not completely ruled out the idea that an 
individual’s PII may have value, they have been reluctant to hold that this 
value translates into injury-in-fact in data collection cases.
213
  One of the 
first data collection decisions, LaCourt v. Specific Media, Inc., contains an 
influential analysis of this issue.  The plaintiffs in LaCourt alleged that the 
defendants had placed “cookies” on their Internet browsers to track, 
without consent, their Internet usage.
214
  The plaintiffs alleged that this 
                                                 
 
213
 Courts have also rejected arguments of injury-in-fact based on loss of PII value in 
data breach cases.  See In re Science Applications Int'l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data 
Theft Litig.,No. 12-347 (JEB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64125, at *7 (D.D.C. May 9, 
2014); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 657 (S.D. Ohio 2014); 
In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad, No. 12-CV-8617, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125730, at *12–
13 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2013); Willingham v. Global Payments, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-01157-
RWS-JFK, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27764, at *20 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2013).  But see 
Claridge v. RockYou, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 2d 855, 861, 866 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“declin[ing] 
to hold . . . as a matter of law” that plaintiff had not alleged Article III standing where 
plaintiff alleged (1) that it had “paid” Defendant, an Internet application producer, with 
the value of his PII in exchange, in part, for a promise to reasonably safeguard that PII, 
and (2) a data breach “caused plaintiff to lose the ‘value’ of their PII, in the form of their 
breached personal data”). 
 
214
 LaCourt v. Specific Media, Inc., No. SACV 10-1256-GW(JCGx), 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 50543, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2011). 
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conduct injured them by collecting information about their browsing 
habits without permission or compensation.
215
  The district court, while 
declining “to say that it is categorically impossible for Plaintiffs to allege 
some property interest that was compromised by Defendant’s alleged 
practices,” held that the plaintiffs had not adequately pled injury under this 
theory.
216
  As the court explained, even if the plaintiffs’ PII has value, the 
plaintiffs could not explain how defendants’ collection of this information 
denied them some other opportunity to exploit it.
217
 
 
[70] Subsequent decisions have followed LaCourt’s approach: while 
not denying that PII may have economic value, they have dismissed 
complaints that fail to explain how plaintiffs could actually exploit the 
value of their own PII themselves.
218
  Other courts have reached similar 
conclusions when evaluating the theory not as a basis for standing, but 
rather as a part of a plaintiff’s substantive legal claim (for example, 
meeting a statutory claim’s damages requirement).219  As a recent decision 
                                                 
215
 See id. at *3–4. 
 
216
 Id. at *11–12. 
 
217
 See id. at *12 (stating that Plaintiffs had failed to allege how Defendant’s conduct 
foreclosed them from entering a “value-for-value exchange” with their own data). 
 
218
 See In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 171124, at *15–16 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013); In re Google Android Consumer 
Privacy Litig., No. 11-MD-02264 JSW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42724, at *14 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 26, 2013); In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., 988 F. 
Supp. 2d 434, 442 (D. Del. 2013); Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc., No. 11-CV-03113 
JSW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42691, at *10, *12 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013); Goodman v. 
HTC Am., Inc., No. C11-1793MJP, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88496, at *20–21 (W.D. 
Wash. June 26, 2012); Low v. Linkedin Corp., No. 11-CV-01468-LHK, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 130840, at *12–13 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2011). 
 
219
 See Vecchio v. Amazon.com, LLC, No. C11-366RSL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76536, 
at *12–13 (W.D. Wash. June 1, 2012) (“Del Vecchio II”); Del Vecchio v. Amazon.com 
Inc., No. C11-366-RSL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138314, at *9–10 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 30, 
2011) (“Del Vecchio I”); see also In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. 
Supp. 2d 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Doubleclick Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 
497, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).  The court in Del Vecchio II did, with little discussion, find the 
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described, plaintiffs will not have standing if they cannot explain how “the 
ability to monetize their PII has been diminished or lost by virtue of” the 
defendant’s actions.220 
 
[71] An example of a Plaintiff successfully articulating such financial 
harm is in Fraley v. Facebook, Inc.  The personal information at issue in 
Fraley was different than in other cases: the plaintiffs had alleged that 
Facebook had used, without authorization, images of them for “sponsored 
stories” that announced on the website that the plaintiffs had endorsed (or, 
in Facebook parlance, had “liked”) a particular business or brand.221  The 
district court concluded that the Plaintiffs had standing, in part because 
they had alleged a violation of a California statutory right against 
misappropriation of likeness.
222
  Additionally, however, the court noted 
that the precise harm alleged by the plaintiffs was much more “concrete 
and particularized” than other PII cases, since the plaintiffs could 
plausibly allege exploitable economic value in “an individual’s 
commercial endorsement of a product or brand to his friends.”223 
 
2.  Breach of Contract 
 
[72] Plaintiffs in data collection cases have also argued that the 
unauthorized collection or transmittal of their PII breached a contract with 
the defendant, thus establishing injury-in-fact.  Similar to data breach 
                                                                                                                         
Plaintiff to have Article III standing, although it appeared to do so either because: (1) the 
Plaintiff had alleged the dissemination of sensitive financial information, or (2) the 
Plaintiff alleged unauthorized use of her computer.  See Del Vecchio II, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 76536, at *5–6; see also In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy 
Litig., 988 F. Supp. 2d 434, 441 (D. Del. 2013) (noting that standing was found in Del 
Vecchio II because Plaintiff alleged dissemination of financial information). 
 
220
 In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 442.  
 
221
 See Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 790 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 
222
 See id. at 796–97. 
 
223
 Id. at 796–798 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1991)). 
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cases, plaintiffs have argued that unauthorized collection or transmittal of 
their PII either (1) breached an express promise by the defendant not to 
collect or transmit such information or (2) made the defendant’s services 
less valuable than the price that the plaintiff originally paid.   
 
[73] While plaintiffs have had success with this argument, uncertainty 
remains about what must precisely be alleged.  One decision has suggested 
that a “contract breach by itself” does not constitute injury-in-fact.224  This 
statement has yet to be truly tested, however, since any plaintiff to 
advance a breach-of-contract theory in a data collection case has also 
alleged some type of injury, even if it is only that they paid more for a 
product or service than they would have had they known the defendant 
was exploiting their PII.  But whether even that establishes injury-in-fact 
is also unclear.  In In re Linkedin User Privacy Litigation, the court 
declined to find injury-in-fact based on the theory that a LinkedIn data 
breach denied them the “benefit of the bargain” paid for by their 
membership dues.
225
  The court explained that “in cases where the alleged 
wrong stems from allegations about insufficient performance or how a 
product functions, courts have required plaintiffs to allege ‘something 
more’ than ‘overpaying for a ‘defective’ product.’”226   
 
[74] Other courts, meanwhile, appear to have taken the view that an 
allegation of overpayment can establish injury-in-fact in data collection 
cases.  In Pirozzi v. Apple, which also involved transmission of PII to 
third-parties, the court stated that “[o]verpaying for goods or purchasing 
goods a person otherwise would not have purchased based upon alleged 
misrepresentations by the manufacturer would satisfy the injury-in-fact 
and causation requirements for Article III standing.”227  Two other courts 
                                                 
224
 See In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 171124, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013). 
 
225
 In re Linkedin User Privacy Litig., 932 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1092–93 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 
226
 Id. at 1094 (quoting In re Toyota Motor Corp., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1165 n.11 (C.D. 
Cal. 2011). 
 
227
 Pirozzi v. Apple, 913 F. Supp. 2d 840, 846–47 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
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have reached similar conclusions.
228
  These courts have also been strict, 
however, in requiring plaintiffs to properly plead that a material 
misrepresentation occurred.
229
  
 
[75] This theory of injury-in-fact remains unsettled for other reasons.  
For example, In re Linkedin User Privacy Litigation cited to decisions 
from “no-injury” product liability suits—cases where plaintiffs allege that 
a defect in a line of products, though not occurring to them, has 
nonetheless harmed them by reducing the value of their particular 
product.
230
  Courts are split generally over how to analyze standing in such 
lawsuits,
231
 and no court has yet considered whether they provide a proper 
analogy for the breach-of-contract claims asserted in data collection suits.  
Considering also that most decisions on this topic come from one 
jurisdiction—the Ninth Circuit—future decisions may remain 
unpredictable. 
 
3.  Impact on Product Performance 
 
[76] In cases where plaintiffs have alleged that defendants collected or 
transmitted PII from their smartphones, courts have been willing to find 
                                                 
228
 See In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171124, at *24–
25; Goodman v. HTC Am., Inc., No. C11-1793MJP, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88496, at 
*14–15 (W.D. Wash. June 26, 2012) (“Plaintiffs’ assertion that they overpaid for their 
smartphones meets the threshold for injury in fact because Defendants allege they would 
have paid less for the phones had Defendants not misrepresented the relevant features of 
the phones.”). 
 
229
 Compare Pirozzi, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 847 (dismissing complaint for lack of standing 
because “Plaintiff fails to allege specifically which statements she found material to her 
decision to purchase an Apple Device or App”), with Pirozzi v. Apple, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 
2d 909, 917–18 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (finding standing based on Plaintiff’s amended 
complaint). 
 
230
 See Linkedin, 932 F. Supp. 2d at 1094. 
 
231
 See Sheila B. Scheuerman, Against Liability for Private Risk-Exposure, 35 HARV. J. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 681, 693–709 (2012). 
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injury-in-fact on the theory that such collection or transmittal adversely 
impacted the performance of the plaintiffs’ phones, typically through 
shortened battery life.  The success of these claims depends on how 
plausibly the plaintiff can allege that the defendant’s conduct has a real, 
rather than simply de minimis, effect on phone performance.
232
  Plaintiffs 
have not succeeded with this theory outside the smartphone context.
233
 
 
4.  Emotional Harm 
 
[77] Whether plaintiffs in data collection cases may establish injury-in-
fact through emotional harm caused by the collection of potentially 
embarrassing personal information remains relatively untested.  In Low v. 
Linkedin Corp., the plaintiff alleged that defendant LinkedIn permitted 
third parties to view its members’ personally identifiable browsing history, 
and that he was “embarrassed and humiliated by the disclosure” of his 
history.
234
  The court declined to find injury-in-fact on this ground, though 
primarily due to the vagueness of the plaintiff’s allegations; as the court 
                                                 
232
 Compare In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040,1054 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(finding standing where Defendant’s practices allegedly “diminished and consumed 
iDevice resources, such as storage, battery life, and bandwidth”), and In re Google 
Android Consumer Privacy Litig., No. 11-MD-02264 JSW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
42724, at *17 (finding standing where Plaintiffs allege “that their batteries discharged 
more quickly and that their services were interrupted”), and Goodman, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 88496, at *19 (finding standing where Defendant’s alleged practices reduce 
battery life and “diminish[] the battery’s storage capacity”), with Yunker v. Pandora 
Media, Inc., No. 11-CV-03113 JSW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42691, at *14 (denying 
standing where Plaintiff “does not allege that he noticed any performance problems or 
that he had problems with his phone because of the diminished memory space”), and 
Hernandez v. Path, Inc., No. 12-CV-01515 YGR, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151035, at *4 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2012) (declining to find standing where Plaintiffs alleged “depletion 
of two to three seconds of battery capacity”). 
 
233
 See LaCourt v. Specific Media, Inc., No. SACV 10-1256-GW(JCGx), 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 50543, at *12–13 (concluding that impact of Defendant’s cookies on Plaintiff’s 
computer was “de minimis” and insufficient to create injury-in-fact). 
 
234
 Low v. Linkedin Corp., No. 11-CV-01468-LHK, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130840, at 
*8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2011). 
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explained, he had “not alleged how third party advertisers would be able to 
infer [his] personal identity” from LinkedIn.235  
 
5.  Expenditures to Prevent Unauthorized Use of PII 
 
[78] Courts have found injury-in-fact to exist where data collection 
plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that they have or will spend money to 
remedy the defendant’s allegedly unlawful use of their PII.  In In re 
Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litigation, a plaintiff established injury-in-
fact by alleging that Google’s change in privacy policy motivated him to 
purchase a new phone.
236
  In Hernandez v. Path, Inc., the plaintiff 
established injury-in-fact by alleging that he wanted to remove the 
defendant’s tracking software from his phone and doing so would cost him 
up to $12,250.00.
237
  
 
6.  Invasion of Statutory and Constitutional Rights 
 
[79] Finally, multiple courts have found standing in data collection 
cases under the theory that the plaintiff had alleged the invasion of a 
statutory or constitutional right.  These decisions almost universally cite to 
the Supreme Court’s statement in Warth v. Seldin that injury-in-fact “may 
exist solely by virtue of ‘statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of 
which creates standing.’”238  Cases from the Ninth Circuit also frequently 
cite to Jewel v. National Security Agency, in which the Ninth Circuit held 
a plaintiff could establish injury-in-fact by alleging violations of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), Foreign Intelligence 
                                                 
235
 Id. at *8–9. 
 
236
 See In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 171124, at *19–23 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013). 
 
237
 See Hernandez v. Path, Inc., No. 12-CV-01515 YGR, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151035, 
at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2012). 
 
238
 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (quoting Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 
U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973)). 
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Surveillance Act (“FISA”), and Stored Communications Act (“SCA”).239  
Within the Ninth Circuit, courts have found injury-in-fact established 
through alleged violations of the Stored Communications Act,
240
 the 
Wiretap Act,
241
 and the Video Privacy Protection Act.
242
  Courts have 
likewise found injury-in-fact established through alleged violations of 
state statutory rights,
243
 as well as state constitutional rights to privacy.
244
  
Courts have found plaintiffs to satisfy any additional requirement that their 
statutory injury be “particularized” (as opposed to a generalized statutory 
                                                 
239
 Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 673 F.3d 902, 906, 912–13 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Fec v. 
Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998)). 
 
240
 See Low v. Linkedin Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1021 (N.D. Cal. 2012); In re 
iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1054–55; Cousineau v. Microsoft Corp., 
992 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121–23 (W.D. Wash. 2012); Gaos v. Google Inc., No. 5:10-CV-
4809 EJD, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44062, at *12–13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012). 
 
241
 See In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1055; In re Facebook Privacy 
Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 712 (N.D. Cal. 2011); In re Zynga Privacy Litig., No. C 10-
04680 JW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154237, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2011), aff’d 750 
F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 
242
 See In re Hulu Privacy Litig., No. C 11-03764 LB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80601, at 
*16 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2012). 
 
243
 See Fraley v. Facebook, 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 797 (N.D. Cal. 2011); In re Google, Inc. 
Gmail Litig., No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172784, at *65 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 26, 2013); Goodman v. HTC Am., Inc., No. C11-1793MJP, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
88496, at *23 (W.D. Wash. June 26, 2012). 
 
244
 See Low, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1021; Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc., No. 11-CV-03113 
JSW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42691, at *16–17 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013); Goodman, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88496, at *38–41.  These decisions have apparently viewed state 
constitutional rights as equivalent to statutory rights for purposes of Article III standing.  
See, e.g., Goodman, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88496, at *38–39 (“A state constitutional or 
statutory provision conferring standing does not replace the requirements of Article III, 
but it serves to expand standing in federal court ‘to the full extent permitted under Article 
III.’”) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 165 (1997)). 
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grievance), so long as their specific PII has been affected by the alleged 
statutory violation.
245
 
 
[80] Parties relying on decisions from the Ninth Circuit should be aware 
that the outer parameters of Warth remain unsettled,
246
 and thus not every 
circuit is guaranteed to agree with Jewel’s holding.  For example, one of 
the few data breach cases to consider statutory injury, In re Barnes & 
Noble Pin Pad Litigation, rejected injury-in-fact on the alleged basis of 
defendant’s violation of state breach notification laws and explained that 
“[p]laintiffs must plead an injury beyond a statutory violation to meet the 
standing requirement of Article III.”247  
 
IV.  INJURY-IN-FACT IN DATA BREACH AND DATA COLLECTION CASES 
AFTER CLAPPER 
[81] As the above cases show, federal courts remain fractured in their 
approach to injury-in-fact in data breach and data collection cases.  While 
courts have reached consistent conclusions with respect to some theories 
of standing, they have sharply disagreed over others.  Clapper, which 
discusses both the collection of data and the ability of plaintiffs to prove 
injury-in-fact through the risk of future harm, presents an opportunity to 
resolve some of these differences of opinion.  Yet Clapper’s precise effect 
on data privacy cases remains unsettled.  Data collection cases have not 
addressed Justice Alito’s majority opinion in any significant detail, while 
the few data breach decisions to do so have drawn different conclusions 
                                                 
245
 See, e.g., Low, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1021 (“Because Plaintiffs have alleged that their 
information has been disclosed to third parties by LinkedIn’s policies, Plaintiffs have 
sufficiently articulated, with particularity, injury as to themselves for the purposes of 
Article III standing.”). 
 
246
 The Supreme Court recently granted, and then dismissed as improvidently granted, 
certiorari in a case that contributed to an existing split over the ability of litigants to 
establish standing solely on the invasion of statutory rights (that is, without any proof of 
real-world injury).  See First Am. Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 132 S. Ct. 2536 (2012). 
 
247
 In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No. 12-cv-8617, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
125730,at *8–9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2013) (citing Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., 222 
F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
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about Clapper’s effect on existing standing law.  Still, these cases do 
suggest, at the very least, that lower courts are inclined to interpret 
Clapper as rejecting the idea that any increase in a risk of future harm may 
support injury-in-fact.  While not a sweeping, across-the-board adoption 
of Clapper’s “certainly impending” language, this development would still 
have significant consequences for data privacy litigation. 
 
A.  Clapper’s Impact in Lower Courts So Far 
 
1.  Data Breach Cases 
 
[82] To date, Clapper has received extended analysis in seven data 
breach cases: In re Sony Gaming Networks and Customer Data Security 
Breach Litigation,
248
 In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litigation,
249
 Galaria 
v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,
250
 Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, 
Inc.,
251
 In re Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC) Backup 
Tape Data Theft Litigation,
252
 Moyer v. Michaels Stores, Inc,
253
 and In re 
Adobe Systems, Inc. Privacy Litigation.
254
  These decisions have reached 
different conclusions about Clapper’s impact on standing law.  The courts 
in In re Sony, Moyer, and In re Adobe expressly disavowed that Clapper 
                                                 
248
 See In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F.Supp.2d 
942, 960–63 (S.D. Cal. 2014). 
 
249
 See In re Barnes & Noble, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125730, at *7–12. 
 
250
 See Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 651–57 (S.D. Ohio 
2014). 
 
251
 See Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., No. 12 C 09115, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
32118, at *11–14, *17–23 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2014). 
 
252
 See In re SAIC Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., No. 12–347 (JEB), 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 64125, at *19–33 (D.D.C. May 9, 2014). 
 
253
 See Moyer v. Michaels Stores, Inc., No. 14 C 561, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96588, at 
*14–16 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014). 
 
254
 See In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., No 13-CV-05226-LHK, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 124126, at *16–32 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 4, 2014). 
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constituted any sort of substantial reworking of standing doctrine.
255
  The 
other decisions, meanwhile, relied, at least in part, on Clapper’s “certainly 
impending” language to dismiss claims of injury premised on an increased 
future risk of identity theft.
256
  
 
[83] In re Sony followed a previous decision of the Southern District of 
California, which had held that customers of Sony who had their personal 
information compromised in a massive data breach could establish injury-
in-fact on the basis of an increased risk of future identity theft, even 
without allegations that any information had actually been used by third 
parties.
257
  Sony asked the court to revisit that holding in light of 
Clapper.
258
  The court did so, and concluded that Clapper did not change 
its earlier conclusion that the plaintiffs had standing to sue.
259
  While the 
court noted Clapper’s “certainly impending” language differed from the 
“real and immediate” language used by the Ninth Circuit in Krottner, it 
concluded that “Clapper did not set forth a new Article III framework, nor 
did the Supreme Court’s decision overrule previous precedent requiring 
that the harm be ‘real and immediate.”260  The Clapper plaintiffs’ 
“speculative chain of possibilities,” the Sony court appeared to believe, 
would have been insufficient to establish injury-in-fact even under 
                                                 
255
 See In re Sony, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 961; In re Adobe, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124126 
*24–27; Moyer, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96588, at *12, *15. 
 
256
 See In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No.12-cv-8617, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
125730, at *7–12 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 3, 2013); Galaria, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 657; Strautins, 
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32118, at *13; In re SAIC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64125, at *50–
51. 
 
257
 See In re Sony, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 962–63. 
 
258
 See id. at 960. 
 
259
 See id. at 961. 
 
260
 Id. 
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Krottner, thus suggesting that Clapper had simply “reiterated an already 
well-established framework” for assessing injury-in-fact.261 
 
[84] In re Barnes & Noble, meanwhile, involved a “skimming” security 
breach at the book retailer through which criminals succeeded in 
collecting credit and debit card numbers used by customers on the store’s 
pin pad machines.
262
  At the time the plaintiffs sued Barnes & Noble, only 
one had suffered a fraudulent charge, which had been previously 
reimbursed.
263
  The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ various theories 
for standing.
264
  Most notably, the court rejected as too speculative the 
plaintiffs’ claims of an increased risk of future identity theft, explaining 
that “[a]s the Supreme Court held in Clapper, ‘threatened injury must be 
certainly impending to constitute injury-in-fact, and . . . [a]llegations of 
possible future injury are not sufficient.’”265  The court likewise rejected 
the plaintiffs’ theory of standing based on their mitigating expenses, 
noting that “such expenses would not qualify as actual injuries under 
Clapper” and that “Plaintiffs ‘cannot manufacture standing by incurring 
costs in anticipation of non-imminent harm.’”266  The court also rejected 
the plaintiffs’ theory of standing based on anxiety and emotional distress, 
as “there is no indication there is an imminent threat” of identity theft.267 
 
                                                 
261
 Id. 
 
262
 See In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No.12-CV-8617, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
125730, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 3, 2013). 
 
263
 See id. at *4–5. 
 
264
 See id. at *16–17. 
 
265
 Id. at *8 (alteration in original) (quoting Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147).  
 
266
 Id. at *11 (quoting Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1155). 
 
267
 Id. at *13–14. 
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[85] The Northern District of Illinois again addressed Clapper’s impact 
on data breach litigation in Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc.
268
  At 
issue in Strautins was a breach at the South Carolina Department of 
Revenue, whereby hackers were able to obtain the Social Security 
numbers of millions of individuals, as well as hundreds of thousands of 
tax records and credit and debit card numbers.
269
  Plaintiff, a South 
Carolina taxpayer, brought suit against the data security company 
responsible for protecting the Department of Revenue, alleging the 
company’s negligence had caused her injury in the form of an increased 
risk of identity theft.
270
  The district court, however, concluded that 
“Clapper compels rejection of [Plaintiff’s] claim that an increased risk of 
identity theft is sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for 
standing.”271  According to the court, any risk of identity theft raised by 
the plaintiff did not rise to Clapper’s “certainly impending” standard.272  
Likewise, Clapper required rejection of plaintiff’s argument that she had 
standing based on present expenses to mitigate the risk of future identity 
theft.
273
 
 
[86] Unlike in In re Barnes & Noble, the court in Strautins attempted to 
reconcile Clapper with the Seventh Circuit’s earlier standing decision in 
Pisciotta.
274
  The district court expressed skepticism that Pisciotta’s 
statement about injury-in-fact—that it could arise from a mere increase in 
                                                 
268
 See Struatins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., No. 12 C 09115, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
32118 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2014).  
 
269
 See id. at *1. 
 
270
 See id. at *2. 
 
271
 See id. at *11. 
 
272
 See id. at *13. 
 
273
 See id. at *13–14 n.9. 
 
274
 See Strautins, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32118, at *18, *20–22.  
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the risk of future harm—had any continuing validity after Clapper.275  In 
the court’s view, “Clapper seems rather plainly to reject the premise, 
implicit in Pisciotta and fairly explicit in Elk Grove Village, that any 
marginal increase in risk is sufficient to confer standing.”276  The court 
noted that Clapper had “expressly rejected the Second Circuit’s 
‘objectively reasonable likelihood’ standard.”277  The court ultimately 
hedged its rejection of Pisciotta, however, by dismissing the plaintiff’s 
complaint on the alternative ground that she had not plausibly alleged the 
theft of her own PII and thus had failed to state a claim.
278
 
 
[87] In Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., the Southern 
District of Ohio similarly relied on Clapper to reject a claim of injury-in-
fact premised on an increased risk of future identity theft.
279
  Like in 
Strautins, the plaintiffs in Galaria sued after hackers gained entry into the 
defendant’s computer network, although neither plaintiff alleged that their 
specific information had been misused.
280
  The district court held the 
                                                 
275
 See id. at *17–19. 
 
276
 Id. at *18.  
 
277
 Id. at *18–19.  
 
278
 See id. at *28–29.  A subsequent decision from the Northern District of Illinois, 
Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, No. 14 C 1735, 2014 WL 4627893 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 16, 
2014), likewise found Clapper to preclude standing for a group of data breach plaintiffs, 
though without expressly finding Pisciotta to be abrogated.  The court in Remijas 
suggested both that Pisciotta was factually reconcilable with Clapper’s “certainly 
impending” standard (a premise that seems to be rejected in cases such as Strautins) and 
that Clapper’s “certainly impending” requirement was less rigorous outside the contexts 
of national security and constitutional law.  See id. at *3; see also Tierney v. Advocate 
Health & Hosp. Corp., No. 13 CV 6237, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 4, 2014) (holding that only 
those data breach plaintiffs who had been notified of fraudulent activity had alleged 
injury-in-fact, though not analyzing the impact of Clapper on prior Seventh Circuit 
standing law). 
 
279
 See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:13-CV-118, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
23798, at *22–24 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 2014). 
 
280
 See id. at *2–4.  
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plaintiffs could not establish injury-in-fact based on an alleged increased 
risk of identity theft, as such risk was not, as Clapper required, “certainly 
impending.”281  The court also relied on Clapper in rejecting the plaintiffs’ 
theory of standing based on their present expenditures to mitigate against 
the risk of future identity theft, and quoted Clapper’s statement that 
litigants “cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on 
themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not 
certainly impending.”282  The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments 
for injury-in-fact based on “loss of privacy” and on the alleged deprivation 
of value of their PII.
283
 
 
[88] The district court in Galaria, like the court in Strautins, also 
considered Clapper’s impact on previous decisions about data breach 
litigation and Article III standing.
284
  The court noted that other data 
breach cases where plaintiffs were found to have standing—including both 
Krottner and Pisciotta—had been decided prior to Clapper.285  The court 
further noted, as did the court in Strautins, that Clapper had “specifically 
rejected the idea that an injury is certainly impending if there is an 
‘objectively reasonable likelihood’ it will occur.”286 
 
[89] In SAIC, the district court reached conclusions similar to those of 
Strautins and Galaria.  However, unlike those cases, SAIC arose from a 
theft of data tapes where it was unclear that the thief was even aware that 
                                                 
281
 See id. at *23–24.  
 
282
 Id. at *24–25 (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013)). 
 
283
 See id. at *28–29 (concluding that the plaintiffs would have standing to pursue a tort 
claim for invasion of privacy, but finding that their complaint failed to state such a 
claim).  
 
284
 See id. at *22. 
 
285
 See Galaria, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23798, at *20–22.  
 
286
 Id. at *22 (citing Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147). 
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she procured sensitive personal data.
287
  The district court held that the 
plaintiffs could not establish standing based on an increased risk of future 
identity theft.
288
  Even if that risk was, as the plaintiffs alleged, 9.5 times 
higher after the breach occurred, Clapper established that “[t]he degree by 
which the harm has increased is irrelevant—instead, the question is 
whether the harm is certainly impending.”289  The court further noted that 
the plaintiff’s alleged risk of identity theft failed to meet even Clapper’s 
“substantial risk” language.290 
 
[90] SAIC also considered the effect that Clapper had on previous data 
privacy decisions.
291
  Like Strautins and Galaria, it viewed Clapper as 
calling into question decisions such as Krottner and Pisciotta.
292
  It 
described decisions finding standing based on an increased risk of identity 
theft as “decided pre-Clapper or rel[iant] on pre-Clapper precedent and 
are, at best, thinly reasoned.”293  The court rejected the continued viability 
of an “increased risk” theory of standing: “After all, an increased risk or 
credible threat of impending harm is plainly different from certainly 
impending harm, and certainly impending harm is what the Constitution 
and Clapper require.”294 
 
                                                 
287
 See In re SAIC Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., No. 12-347 (JEB), 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 64125, at *1 (D.D.C. May 9, 2014). 
 
288
 See id. at *7. 
 
289
 Id. at *22. 
 
290
 See id. at *26–27. 
 
291
 See id. at *31–32. 
 
292
 See id. at *31–32. 
 
293
 In re SAIC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64125, at *31–32.  
 
294
 Id. at *32–34. 
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[91] In Moyer, by contrast, another judge from the Northern District of 
Illinois disagreed that Clapper had abrogated the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in Pisciotta.
295
  The plaintiffs in Moyer alleged that they were at 
an increased risk of identity theft after using their credit and debit cards at 
Michaels Stores within a time period during which Michaels may have 
experienced a data security attack.
296
  Though the district court ultimately 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim, it first 
concluded that the plaintiffs had alleged Article III injury-in-fact due to an 
elevated risk of identity theft.
297
  
 
[92] Notably, the court in Moyer disagreed with any suggestion from 
Strautins and Barnes & Noble that Clapper had abrogated the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Pisciotta.298  According to the court, Pisciotta 
remained good law for two reasons.
299
  First, Clapper involved a 
constitutional challenge to a federal national security law, and the extent to 
which its standing analysis applied outside that specific context was “an 
open question.”300  Second, the court noted that other Supreme Court 
decisions, such as Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus
301
 and Geertson Seed 
Farms,
302
 demonstrate that the Supreme Court has also applied a less 
rigorous standing analysis than Clapper’s for allegations of future 
                                                 
295
 See Moyer v. Michaels Stores, Inc., No. 14 C 561, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96588, at 
*15 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014). 
 
296
 See id. at *2. 
 
297
 See id. at *19, *24. 
 
298
 See id. at *14–15. 
 
299
 See id. at *15–16, *19. 
 
300
 Id. at *15.  
 
301
 Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2343 (2014) (permitting pre-
enforcement challenge to state statute criminalizing false statements about candidates 
during political campaigns). 
 
302
 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 155 (2010). 
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injury.
303
  The court further observed that Clapper was factually 
distinguishable from the plaintiffs’ claims because while at least one 
customer of Michaels had reported identity theft after the security breach, 
in Clapper, there was “no evidence that the relevant risk of harm had ever 
materialized in similar circumstances.”304 
 
[93] Most recently, in In re Adobe, the Northern District of California 
agreed with In re Sony that, despite Clapper, the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
in Krottner remained good law.
305
  The claims in In re Adobe arose from a 
sophisticated, weeks-long hacking operation through which hackers 
obtained and decrypted the personal information and credit card numbers 
of over 38 million Adobe customers.
306
  Citing to SAIC, Strautins, and 
Galaria, among other cases, Adobe argued that the plaintiffs could not 
establish injury-in-fact through an alleged increased risk of identity 
theft.
307
  The court disagreed, and noted that “Clapper did not change the 
law governing Article III standing.”308  As the court explained, Krottner 
was already “closer to Clapper’s ‘certainly impending’ language” than it 
was to the Second Circuit’s rejected “objective reasonable likelihood” 
standard.
309
  Regardless, the court found the plaintiffs’ allegations, which 
involved an elaborate crime clearly designed to obtain personal 
information, some of which had already had been misused, to plausibly 
allege “certainly impending” harm.310 
                                                 
303
 See Moyer, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96588, at *16–18. 
 
304
 Id. at *19. 
 
305
 See In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., No. 13-CV-05226-LHK, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 124126, at *32 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 4, 2014).  
 
306
 See id. at *6–7. 
 
307
 Id. at *21. 
 
308
 Id. at *24 
 
309
 Id. at *26.  
 
310
 See id. at *28. 
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[94] Other data breach decisions have mentioned Clapper, albeit with 
less analysis.  The District of Kansas cited Clapper in a decision finding 
no standing where no data breach had been alleged to have occurred—a 
position courts consistently reached even before Clapper.
311
  Likewise, the 
District of New Jersey cited Clapper in Polanco v. Omnicell, Inc.,
312
 
which dismissed for lack of standing a plaintiff who claimed that she 
suffered injury-in-fact because she avoided treatment at hospitals served 
by the defendant company, which had previously experienced a data 
breach and which the plaintiff believed to employ inadequate data security 
measures.
313
  The district court cited to Clapper in dismissing this claim, 
though its analysis suggested that it did not view Clapper as changing in 
any substantive way the Third Circuit’s binding analysis in Reilly.314 
 
[95] These opinions demonstrate different perspectives on how Clapper 
impacts existing standing law.  On one side, decisions such as Strautins, 
Galaria, and SAIC view Clapper as abrogating appellate decisions like 
Pisciotta.  On the other side, In re Sony, Moyer, and In re Adobe assert 
that Clapper did not effect any sort of substantial change in standing 
law.
315
  These opinions also demonstrate the Clapper majority opinion’s 
                                                 
311
 See Hammer v. Sam’s East, Inc., No. 12-CV-2618-CM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
98707, at *4–8 (D. Kan. July 16, 2013). 
 
312
 See Polanco v. Omnicell, Inc., 988 F. Supp. 2d 451, 466 (D.N.J. 2013). 
 
313
 See id. at 468–71. 
 
314
 See id. at 466–67. 
 
315
 Another example of courts’ taking fundamentally different views on Clapper is a 
comparison of In re Sony with Polanco.  While both decisions found Clapper not to have 
disrupted existing standing law, In re Sony viewed Clapper as consistent with the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Krottner, while Polanco viewed it as consistent with the Third 
Circuit’s decision in Reilly.  Compare In re Sony, 996 F. Supp. 942, 961–63 (“the Court 
finds both Clapper and Krottner controlling”), with Polanco 988 F. Supp. 2d at 466 
(noting the similarity between the holdings in Reilly and Clapper). 
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open-ended nature.
316
  Though Strautins, Galaria, and SAIC recite 
Clapper’s “certainly impending” language, no decision conclusively 
endorses such language as the governing standard for assessing all claims 
of injury-in-fact premised on future harm.  Rather, all three opinions 
follow Clapper’s approach and decline to decide whether a “substantial 
risk” standard might apply in other circumstances.317     
 
[96] Still, the courts in Barnes & Noble, Strautins, Galaria, SAIC, and 
Polanco all interpreted Clapper as imposing some sort of objective 
imminence threshold that an increased risk of harm must meet before it 
constitutes injury-in-fact.  That is, all five decisions do appear to agree 
that, under Clapper, injury-in-fact requires something more than just a 
slight risk of future harm.  Even In re Sony and In re Adobe, which take 
more limited views of Clapper’s effect on standing law, reached arguably 
consistent results.  Though In re Sony admittedly cites with approval 
decisions such as Pisciotta,
 318
 the district courts in both cases held only 
that Clapper did not change the Ninth Circuit’s “real and immediate” 
requirement for future harm—an arguably more rigorous standard than the 
“increased risk” language rejected in Strautins, Galaria, and SAIC.319 
 
                                                 
316
 See Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings Inc., No. 12 C 09115, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
32118, at *5 n.11 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2014) (noting that “the import of Clapper for 
standing analysis in the Seventh Circuit a question on which reasonable minds may 
differ”). 
 
317
 See Strautins, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32118 at *8–9; Galaria, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
23798 at *14–15; In re SAIC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64125 at *25–26. 
 
318
 See In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 
2d 942, 961–62 n.8 (citing favorably to Pisciotta and other decisions stating that a mere 
increased risk of harm can support standing). 
 
319
 See id. at 961.  In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., No. 13-CV-05226-LHK, 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124126, at *25–26 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 4, 2014).  
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[97] Moyer, by contrast, appears to have taken a position less 
reconcilable with an objective imminence requirement.
320
  Unlike in In re 
Sony, the court in Moyer did rely on Pisciotta for its standing analysis.
321
  
And the court concluded that plaintiffs had established standing by 
alleging “a credible, non-speculative risk of future harm”—a standard that 
would appear to be less rigorous than even the Ninth Circuit’s “real and 
immediate” standard.322  Still, Moyer’s more expansive view of standing 
remains the minority among the post-Clapper data breach cases.  
 
[98] In short, while lower courts may have reached different 
conclusions about the extent of Clapper’s effect on data privacy litigation, 
they have been more consistent in viewing Clapper as rejecting the 
proposition that any increase risk of future harm can support Article III 
standing.  Though this conclusion is consistent with much of the standing 
law to come before Clapper, it is in tension with some decisions, such as 
the Seventh Circuit’s in Pisciotta.  Whether Clapper will ultimately result, 
as Strautins, Galaria, and SAIC suggest, in the abrogation of decisions like 
Pisciotta remains to be seen. 
 
2.  Data Collection Cases 
 
[99] With respect to data collection lawsuits, Clapper has been more 
notable in its absence than in its presence.  To date, Clapper has appeared 
as a brief citation in three data collection cases: Yunker, In re Google 
Android Consumer Privacy Litigation, and In re iPhone Application 
Litigation.
323
  While both Yunker and In re Google Android quote 
                                                 
320
 See Moyer v. Michaels Stores, Inc., No. 14 C 561, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96588 at 
*19 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014). 
 
321
 See id. (noting that holding on standing “follows from Pisciotta”). 
 
322
 See id. at *17. 
 
323
 Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc., No. 11-CV-03113 JSW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
42691, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013); In re Google Android Consumer Privacy Litig., 
No. 11-MD-02264 JSW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42724, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 
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Clapper’s “certainly impending” language as part of their general 
recitation of standing requirements,
324
 neither case suggests that Clapper 
affects previous standing doctrine.  And other courts, whether cognizant of 
Clapper or not, have continued to find injury-in-fact established for data 
collection plaintiffs under theories of overpayment for goods and 
services,
325
 impact on device performance,
326
 and invasion of statutory 
rights.
327
 
 
A. Clapper and Data Privacy Cases Going Forward 
 
[100] An analysis of Clapper itself supports the conclusions reached by 
most of the lower courts that have considered its effect on standing law.  
While the majority opinion’s “certainly impending” language suggests a 
high hurdle for plaintiffs seeking to prove injury-in-fact premised on an 
increased risk of future harm, the opinion also leaves open the possibility 
that such a requirement may not apply in all cases.
328
  The majority’s 
rejection of the Second Circuit’s “objectively reasonable 
likelihood”329standard, meanwhile, is much more unequivocal, and thus 
much more likely to affect standing cases going forward.  Still, a far-
reaching impact is not guaranteed: Clapper is unclear enough about the 
                                                                                                                         
2013); In re iPhone Application Litig., No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
169220, at *24 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2013). 
 
324
  See Yunker, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42691 at *8; In re Google, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 42724 at *11–12. 
 
325
 See, e.g., In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 171124, at *23–24 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013). 
 
326
 See, e.g., id. at *19–20. 
 
327
 See, e.g., In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., 988 F. Supp. 
2d 434, 442 (D. Del. 2013). 
 
328
 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013). 
 
329
 Id. at 1147. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XXI, Issue 1 
 
 63 
scope of cases to which it applies that lower courts could, as Moyer 
suggests, effectively limit it to the national security context.
330
  Moreover, 
even if courts do generally adopt a broad reading of Clapper, it may 
simply have the effect of pushing data privacy litigants toward other 
theories of standing that do not depend on future injury. 
 
[101] As mentioned above, viewed in light of the issues germane to data 
breach and data collection cases, Clapper’s most notable aspect is its 
statement that threatened harm must be “certainly impending”331 in order 
to constitute injury-in-fact.  Indeed, this language from Clapper has been 
its most widely quoted among lower courts, and has obvious relevance for 
cases where injury is alleged in the form of either an increased risk of 
future identity theft or present expenses incurred to mitigate that risk.
332
  
But as explained earlier, the Clapper majority opinion reserves decision 
on whether “certainly impending ” is the only applicable standard for 
assessing threatened injuries.
333
  In a footnote it concedes that “[o]ur cases 
do not uniformly require plaintiffs to demonstrate that it is literally certain 
that the harms they identify will come about,”334 and recognizes that a 
separate “substantial risk” standard may also exist for injury-in-fact 
premised on the risk of future harm.
335
  Thus, and as the decisions 
discussed above demonstrate, while courts may choose to adopt Clapper’s 
                                                 
330
 See Moyer v. Michaels Stores, No. 14 C 561, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96588, at *19 
(N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014); see also In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., No. 13-CV-
05226-LHK, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124126, at *25 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 4, 2014) (observing 
that “Clapper’s discussion of standing arose in the sensitive context of a claim that other 
branches of government were violating the Constitution, and the U.S. Supreme Court 
noted that its standing analysis was unusually rigorous as a result”).   
 
331
 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1155. 
 
332
 See supra section III.A.  
 
333
 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1150 n.5. 
 
334
 Id. 
 
335
 Id. 
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“certainly impending” language as the substantive requirement for 
alleging injury-in-fact in future data breach cases, Clapper itself does not 
necessarily compel them to do so.
336
  
 
[102] Clapper is much more unequivocal, however, in its rejection of the 
Second Circuit’s “objectively reasonable likelihood” standard for 
assessing future injury.
337
  This aspect of the majority opinion may be 
more likely to alter the existing legal landscape on data litigation and 
injury-in-fact.  Indeed, it is the rejection of the Second Circuit’s standard, 
rather than the endorsement of a “certainly impending” standing, that 
Strautins and Galaria view as abrogating or potentially abrogating 
previous circuit court opinions.
338
  This does not mean, of course, that 
Clapper necessarily abrogates the holdings of decisions like Pisciotta or 
Krottner; lower courts may still conclude, like in In re Sony and In re 
Adobe, that the risk of injury in those cases satisfied whatever minimum 
threshold of probability that Clapper imposed.  Still, if Clapper makes 
clear that an “objectively reasonable likelihood” standard is inappropriate 
for assessing injury-in-fact based on a risk of future harm, it becomes 
difficult to see how establishing injury-in-fact based on only a “small” or 
“increased” risk of harm is not also inappropriate. 
 
[103] Aside from the scope of Clapper’s holding, courts in data privacy 
cases may also be able to distinguish the decision on factual grounds.  
                                                 
336
 In its most recent statement about standing and future harm, the Court continued to 
leave this issue open.  See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 
(2014) (“An allegation of future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is ‘certainly 
impending,’ or there is a ‘‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.”) (quoting Clapper, 
133 S. Ct. at 1150 n.5). 
 
337
 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (“As an initial matter, the Second Circuit’s 
‘objectively reasonable likelihood’ standard is inconsistent with our requirement that 
‘threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact.’”) (quoting 
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)). 
 
338
 See Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., No. 12 C 09115, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
32118, at *18–19 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2014); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 
2:13-CV-118, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23798, at *22 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 2014). 
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Justice Alito began Clapper’s standing analysis by noting the presence of 
two factors that, in his view, called for a conservative standing analysis: 
(1) that the plaintiffs’ claims would “force [the Court] to decide whether 
an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal 
Government was unconstitutional”;339 and (2) that the plaintiffs’ claims 
would require the Court “to review actions of the political branches in the 
fields of intelligence gathering and foreign affairs.”340  Neither of these 
factors is typically present in a data breach case.  Still, most courts so far 
have not construed this potion of Clapper as precluding its application to 
data breach cases.  
 
[104] Clapper’s impact on other theories of standing used in data privacy 
cases is not obvious.  Most of these other theories allege the existence of a 
present, rather than future, injury.
341
  Perhaps most notably, Clapper 
would seemingly have little effect on plaintiffs who allege injury from an 
invasion of statutory rights—a theory of standing that may become 
increasingly available to data privacy plaintiffs if legislatures enact 
additional statutory causes of action.
342
  If lower courts decide to read 
                                                 
339
 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147. 
 
340
 Id.; see also LEADING CASE: II. Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure: C. Standing-
Challenges to Government Surveillance-Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 298, 298 (2013) (arguing that Clapper’s “certainly impending” language 
“should only be applied to litigants challenging governmental action in foreign affairs or 
national security”). 
 
341
 A possible exception may be standing premised on anxiety and emotional distress due 
to the perceived risk of future identity theft, which some courts have tied to the 
reasonableness of the threat causing the anxiety.  The plaintiffs in Clapper did not make 
any sort of emotional-distress claim, however. 
 
342
 See Patricia Cove, Note, Giving Consumers a Leg to Stand On: Finding Plaintiffs a 
Legislative Solution to the Barrier from Federal Courts in Data Security Breach Suits, 62 
CATH. U. L. REV. 765, 769 (2013) (advocating for legislation to give plaintiffs a data 
breach suits a statutory cause of action, thereby overcoming previous decisions denying 
such plaintiffs standing).  The plaintiffs in both Strautins and Galaria, for example, 
alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act in addition to their other claims and 
failed.  See Strautins, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32118, at *7; Galaria, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 23798, at *2.  But see In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 13-CV-05226-LK, 
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Clapper broadly, more plaintiffs may plead these alternative theories of 
standing in place of theories premised on the risk of future harm. 
 
[105] Clapper accordingly has the potential to change how injury-in-fact 
is alleged in data privacy cases, particularly if courts continue to find that 
its rejection of the Second Circuit’s “objectively reasonable likelihood” 
standard requires abandonment of similarly lax language about injury-in-
fact found in other circuits’ case law.  But given the other potential 
avenues for plaintiffs to assert injury-in-fact in data breach cases, it is less 
certain that Clapper will significantly reduce the number of data privacy 
plaintiffs who manage to proceed forward with their claims.  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
[106] Even after Clapper, federal courts continue to differ in their 
conclusions about the Article III standing of plaintiffs in data breach and 
data collection lawsuits.  Despite this lack of consensus, the data privacy 
decisions issued in the wake of Clapper do suggest that lower courts, 
while not likely to all impose Clapper’s “certainly impending” language 
as an across-the-board standing requirement for plaintiffs, are nonetheless 
generally inclined to view Clapper as a rejection of the laxer standing 
requirements of decisions such as the Seventh Circuit’s in Pisciotta and 
even the Ninth Circuit’s in Krottner.  Such a view, if widely adopted, 
could have a significant impact on data privacy litigation.  Plaintiffs 
alleging injury-in-fact due to an increased risk of future harm will more 
likely encounter a rigorous, objective judicial analysis of how imminent 
the alleged risk of harm actually is.  This in turn may push data privacy 
plaintiffs to other theories of standing, such as invasion of statutory rights, 
which do not depend on future harm.  In sum, while Clapper’s exact 
impact on data privacy litigation still remains undetermined, it has already 
demonstrated its potential to shift the current standing debate in such cases 
                                                                                                                         
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124126, at *34 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2014) (holding that plaintiffs 
had not alleged independent injury to support a claim for violation of the California 
Customer Records Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.2, which requires prompt notification 
about data breaches). 
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away from the risk of future harm and toward allegations of presently 
suffered injury. 
 
